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Humanitarian Intervention at the




Scholarship on humanitarian intervention is plentiful, but
actual examples of state practice and opinio juris are sparse.
Thus, critics conclude, the doctrine of humanitarian intervention
has no legal basis in international aw. This Article challenges
this viewpoint. It does so by departing from the traditional
framework of international law and adopting an alternative
framework of analysis: the study of incidents. Through an
examination of seven incidents over the past decade, this Article
reveals that the doctrine of humanitarian intervention, though
not yet an established norm of international aw, functions to
widen traditional exceptions to the prohibition on the use of force.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
1. INTRODUCTION ...................................... 416
II. BACKGROUND ....................................... 419
A. The Prohibition on the Use of Force ............ 419
B. The Responsibility to Protect ................. 422
III. HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION ........................ 425
A. Humanitarian Intervention as a
Customary Exception ....................... 427
B. The History of Humanitarian Intervention..... 428
C. Kosovo, Libya, and Syria .................... 431
D. The Study of Incidents ..................... 433
IV. RECENT INCIDENTS OF HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION 435
A. The Proposed IGAD Intervention in
Somalia (2005-2006) ....................... 436
B. The NATO Intervention in Libya (2011).......... 439
C. The UNOCIl/French Intervention in
C6te d'Ivoire (2011) .......................... 442
D. The French Intervention in Mali (2013) .......... 444
E. The Proposed U.S. / U.K Intervention
in Syria (2013)............................. 447
F. The U.S. Intervention at Mount Sinjar
in Iraq (2014)................. ............ 450
415
VANDERBILTJOUNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW
G. The U.S. -Led Intervention in Syria
(2014-2016) ........................ ...... 452
V. HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION AT THE MARGINS ........ 455
A. Mission Creep .... ......................... 456
B. Antiterrorism ............................. 457
C. Partisan Support.. ....................... 458
VI. CONCLUSION ............................................. 460
I. INTRODUCTION
For over five years, the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL)
has been committing gross violations of human rights on Syrian
territory.1 As of August 2016, eleven states have submitted letters to
the United Nations justifying military action against ISIL in Syria.2
* Law Clerk, International Court of Justice; J.D., Yale Law School; A.B.,
Princeton University. Email: ptzeng90@gmail.com. The author would like to thank
Professor W. Michael Reisman for his guidance on earlier drafts of this Article. The
author would also like to thank the Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law editorial
team for their excellent editing, feedback, and suggestions. The views expressed in this
Article are solely those of the author, and do not necessarily reflect the views of the
International Court of Justice or the United Nations.
1. U.N. Human Rights Council, "They Came to Destroy": ISIS Crimes Against
the Yazidis, U.N. Doc. A[HRC/32/CRP.2 (June 15, 2016); Amnesty Int'l, Rule of Fear:
ISIS Abuses in Detention in Northern Syria, Al Index MDE 24/063/2013 (Dec. 19, 2013);
Fr6d6ric Gilles Sourgens, The End of Law: The ISIL Case Study for a Comprehensive
Theory of Lawlessness, 39 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 355, 378-79 (2015).
2. Permanent Rep. of Belgium to the U.N., Letter dated June 7, 2016 from the
Permanent Rep. of Belgium to the United Nations addressed to the President of the
Security Council, U.N. Doc. S/2016/523 (June 9, 2016) [hereinafter Belgian Article 51
Letter]; Permanent Rep. of Norway to the U.N., Letter dated June 3, 2016 from the
Permanent Rep. of Norway to the United Nations addressed to the President of the
Security Council, U.N. Doc. S/2016/513 (June 3, 2016) [hereinafter Norwegian Article 51
Letter]; Charg6 d'affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of the Netherlands to the U.N.,
Letter dated Feb. 10, 2016 from the Charg6 d'affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of
the Netherlands to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security
Council, U.N. Doc. S/2016/132 (Feb. 10, 2016) [hereinafter Dutch Article 51 Letter];
Permanent Rep. of Denmark to the U.N., Letter dated Jan. 11, 2016 from the Permanent
Rep. of Denmark to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security
Council, U.N. Doc. S/2016/34 (Jan. 13, 2016) [hereinafter Danish Article 51 Letter];
Charg6 d'affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of Germany to the U.N., Letter dated
Dec. 10, 2015 from the Charg6 d'affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of Germany to
the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council, U.N. Doc.
S/2015/946 (Dec. 10, 2015) [hereinafter German Article 51 Letter]; Permanent Rep. of
Australia to the U.N., Letter dated Sept. 9, 2015 from the Permanent Rep. of Australia
to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council, U.N. Doc.
S/2015/693 (Sept. 9, 2015) [hereinafter Australian Article 51 Letter]; Permanent Rep. of
France to the U.N., Identical letters dated Sept. 8, 2015 from the Permanent Rep. of
France to the United Nations and to the Secretary-General and the President of the
Security Council, U.N. Doc. S/2015/745 (Sept. 9, 2015) [hereinafter French Article 51
Letter]; Charg6 d'affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of Turkey to the U.N., Letter
dated July 24, 2015 from the Charg6 d'affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of Turkey
to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council, U.N. Doc.
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All eleven letters invoke the right of self-defense under Article 51 of
the Charter of the United Nations.3 Four of the letters additionally
stress how the Syrian government is "unwilling or unable" to prevent
attacks originating from the concerned territory. 4 And two of the
letters note that the Syrian government no longer exercises "effective
control" over the territory in question.5 One justification, however, is
notably missing from all eleven letters: the doctrine of humanitarian
intervention.6
This story should sound strikingly familiar. In 1999, the North
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) proceeded, without express
Security Council authorization, to bomb the Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia for the purpose of ending widespread human rights
violations in Kosovo. Although undoubtedly motivated by
humanitarian concerns, the NATO states subsequently justified their
actions before the International Court of Justice (ICJ) and the Security
Council by making reference to Security Council resolutions.7 The
S/2015/563 (July 24, 2015) [hereinafter Turkish Article 51 Letter]; Charg6 d'affaires a.i.
of the Permanent Mission of Canada to the U.N., Letter dated Mar. 31, 2015 from the
Charg6 d'affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of Canada to the United Nations
addressed to the President of the Security Council, U.N. Doc. S/2015/221 (Mar. 31, 2015)
[hereinafter Canadian Article 51 Letter]; Permanent Rep. of the United Kingdom of
Great Britain and Northern Ireland to the U.N., Identical letters dated Nov. 25, 2014
from the Permanent Rep. of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the
Security Council, U.N. Doc. S/2014/851 (Nov. 26, 2014) [hereinafter U.K Article 51
Letter]; Permanent Rep. of the United States of America to the U.N., Letter dated Sept.
23, 2014 from the Permanent Rep. of the United States to the United Nations addressed
to the Secretary-General, U.N. Doc. S/2014/695 (Sept. 23, 2014) [hereinafter U.S. Article
51 Letter]. Some states have submitted more than one letter, but this discussion focuses
on the first letter of justification submitted by each state.
3. U.N. Charter art. 51; see generally supra note 2.
4. Australian Article 51 Letter, supra note 2; Turkish Article 51 Letter, supra
note 2; Canadian Article 51 Letter, supra note 2; U.S. Article 51 Letter, supra note 2.
5. Belgian Article 51 Letter, supra note 2; German Article 51 Letter, supra note 2.
6. For a definition of the term "humanitarian intervention" as used in this
Article, see text accompanying infra note 59.
7. Legality of Use of Force (Yugoslavia v. Belg.), Verbatim Record, CR 99/15, at
15 (May 10, 1999) ("[L]e Royaume de Belgique est d'avis que l'intervention armie trouve
un fondement sans conteste dans les r6solutions du Conseil de s6curit6 que je viens de
citer."); Legality of Use of Force (Yugoslavia v. U.K.), Verbatim Record, CR 99/14, at 36
(May 10, 1999); CHRISTINE GRAY, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE 45-47 (3d
ed. 2008); Ian Johnstone, When the Security Council is Divided: Imprecise
Authorizations, Implied Mandates, and the 'Unreasonable Veto', in THE OXFORD
HANDBOOK OF THE USE OF FORCE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 227, 239-43 (Marc Weller ed.,
2015); Vaughan Lowe & Antonios Tzanakopoulos, Humanitarian Intervention, in MAX
PLANCK ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW, 1 32 (Rildiger Wolfrum ed.,
2012); Jane Stromseth, Rethinking Humanitarian Intervention: The Case for
Incremental Change, in HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION: ETHICAL, LEGAL, AND POLITICAL
DILEMMAS 232, 235 (J.L. Holzgrefe & Robert 0. Keohane eds., 2003). It should be noted
that Belgium and the United Kingdom invoked humanitarian intervention to justify the
Kosovo intervention, but they did so alongside their invocations of Security Council
resolutions. See infra note 83.
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words "humanitarian intervention" did not even appear in most of the
states' pleadings before the ICJ.8
What does this mean for the status of the doctrine of
humanitarian intervention in international law? According to critics,
if intervening states consistently refuse to invoke the doctrine when it
would seemingly apply, the doctrine must not exist. 9 Although a
vibrant topic in academic scholarship, the doctrine does not have the
requisite state practice and opinio juris to support its existence in
international law.1 0 In order for such a doctrine to exist, these critics
argue, states need to expressly rely on it as a legal justification for a
military intervention."
This Article challenges this viewpoint. It does so by departing
from the traditional framework of customary international law based
on state practice and opinio juris. Instead, this Article adopts a modern
framework of analysis: the study of incidents. By examining seven
recent incidents, this Article concludes that the doctrine of
humanitarian intervention, though not yet an established norm of
international law, has been actively developing at the margins over the
past decade. In particular, these incidents reveal that the doctrine of
humanitarian intervention functions to widen traditional exceptions to
the prohibition on the use of force.
This Article is organized as follows. Part II provides background
on the prohibition on the use of force and the Responsibility to Protect.
Part III discusses the doctrine of humanitarian intervention, examines
its history, and explains the reasons why a study of incidents is
appropriate for its analysis. Part IV then examines seven incidents of
humanitarian intervention over the past decade. Part V explains how
8. E.g., Legality of Use of Force (Yugoslavia v. Can.) (Yugoslavia v. Neth.)
(Yugoslavia v. Fr.) (Yugoslavia v. It.), Verbatim Record, CR 99/25 (May 12, 1999).
9. See, e.g., Arman Sarvarian, Humanitarian Intervention After Syria, 36
LEGAL STUD. 20, 30 (2016); Tamas Hoffmann, Dr. Opinio Juris and Mr. State Practice:
The Strange Case of Customary International Humanitarian Law, 47 ANNALES
UNIVERSITATIS SCIENTIARUM BUDAPESTINENSIS DE ROLANDO EOTvOs NOMN'ATAE:
SECTIO IURIDICA [ANNALES U. SCI. BUDAPESTINENSIS RLANDO EOTvO] 373, 381 (2006)
(Hung.); Jonathan I. Charney, Anticipatory Humanitarian Intervention in Kosovo, 32
VAND. J. TRANSNA'L L. 1231, 1238-39 (1999); Yogesh K. Tyagi, The Concept of
Humanitarian Intervention Revisited, 16 MICH. J. IN'L L. 883, 893 (1995); Lowe &
Tzanakopoulos, supra note 7, 1 34.
10. State practice and opinio juris are the two components of customary
international law. See infra notes 67-72 and accompanying text.
11. See, e.g., Lowe & Tzanakopoulos, supra note 7, } 34 ('The fact that
intervening States have been so reluctant to rely explicitly on a right of humanitarian
intervention means that there is great difficulty in finding any opinio iuris that can
properly be counted towards the establishment of a right of humanitarian
intervention."); Charney, supra note 9, at 1238 ("[F]ew, if any, interventions can be found
in which the intervening states have expressly based their actions on the right of
humanitarian intervention. In the absence of such a linkage by the intervening states,
the actions can hardly serve as opinio juris in support of such a right."); Sarvarian, supra
note 9, at 30 ("[T]he absence of publicly articulated legal positions by states that
humanitarian intervention is lawful defeats [the] ultimate argument of legality.").
[VOL. 50:415418
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these incidents reflect the development of the doctrine of humanitarian
intervention at the margins. Finally, Part VI draws conclusions
regarding humanitarian intervention in light of this study.
II. BACKGROUND
There is a growing tension between two fundamental notions of
international law: state sovereignty and human rights.12 Although
both concepts are enshrined in the U.N. Charter,13 for several decades
after 1945, the former took precedence over the latter. This
phenomenon resulted, at least in part, from the relative clarity of the
prohibition on the use of force enshrined in Article 2(4) of the U.N.
Charter, and the relative lack of clarity of the normative force of
fundamental human rights.14
A. The Prohibition on the Use of Force
Article 2(4) establishes the prohibition on the use of force in
international relations.'5 Not only has the prohibition been deemed a
"cornerstone" of the U.N. Charter,16 but it is widely considered a jus
cogens norm.17 There are only three widely accepted exceptions to the
prohibition.1'
12. W. Michael Reisman, Probl~mes actuels du recours & la force en droit
international, Sous-groupe sur l'intervention humanitaire [Present Problems of the Use of
Force in International Law, Sub-group on Humanitarian Intervention], 72 ANNUAIRE DE
L'INSTITUT DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL - SESSION DE SANTIAGO DU CHILI 238, 248 (2007)
[hereinafter Reisman, Present Problems of the Use of Force in International Law].
13. See U.N. Charter art. 1, 1 3; U.N. Charter art. 2, 1 1.
14. See Reisman, Present Problems of the Use of Force in International Law,
supra note 12, at 241.
15. U.N. Charter art. 2, 1 4.
16. Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Dem. Rep. Congo v.
Uganda), Judgment, 2005 I.C.J. Rep. 168, T 148 (Dec. 19) ("The prohibition against the
use of force is a cornerstone of the United Nations Charter."); Oil Platforms (Iran v. U.S.),
Dissenting Opinion appended to Judgment, 2003 I.C.J. Rep. 219, 1 1.1 (Nov. 6) ("The
principle of the prohibition of the use of force in international relations . . . is, no doubt,
the most important principle in contemporary international law to govern inter-State
conduct; it is indeed the cornerstone of the Charter.").
17. Oliver Dbrr, Use of Force, Prohibition of, in MAX PLANCK ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 1 1 (June 2011); e.g., Iran v. U.S., 2003 I.C.J. 1 1.1 ('The
principle of the prohibition of the use of force in international relations . .. reflects a rule
of jus cogens from which no derogation is permitted."). Jus cogens norms, also called
peremptory norms, are rules of international law from which no derogation is permitted.
JAMES R. CRAWFORD, BROWNLIE'S PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 389-90
(8th ed. 2012).
18. ANTONIO CASSESE, INTERNATIONAL LAW 305-20 (2001); Monica Hakimi, To
Condone or Condemn? Regional Enforcement Actions in the Absence of Security Council
Authorization, 40 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 643, 645 (2007) ("The Charter prohibits the
use of force against any state, except with that state's consent, in self-defense, or as
authorized by the Security Council under Chapter VI.").
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First, under Article 42 of the U.N. Charter, a state may use force
if authorized by the Security Council under Chapter VII of the U.N.
Charter in response to a threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or an
act of aggression.1 9 Although Article 42 vests the authorization power
solely in the Security Council, the General Assembly's Uniting for
Peace resolution 20 and the ICJ's Certain Expenses 21 and Wall 22
advisory opinions recognize that the General Assembly may exercise
Chapter VII powers if the Security Council proves to be paralyzed.23
Second, under Article 51 of the U.N. Charter, a state may use force
in individual or collective self-defense in response to an armed attack.24
As the lCJ clarified in Military and Paramilitary Activities and later
confirmed in Oil Platforms, only "the most grave forms of the use of
force" constitute an "armed attack."25 The Court in those cases also
emphasized that the use of force in response to an armed attack must
comply with the principles of necessity and proportionality. 26
Third, a state may use force if the host state consents.27 Although
this exception is not enshrined in the U.N. Charter, the ICJ, in Military
and Paramilitary Activities, expressly accepted consent as an
exception to the prohibition,28 and, more recently, in Armed Activities,
appeared to apply this principle in its analysis of the merits of the
19. U.N. Charter art. 42.
20. G.A. Res. 377 (V), at 10 (Nov. 3, 1950).
21. The Court in Certain Expenses held that Article 24 of the U.N. Charter
grants the Security Council primary but not exclusive responsibility for the maintenance
of international peace and security. Certain Expenses of the United Nations, Advisory
Opinion, 1962 I.C.J. 151, 163 (July 20). However, the Court also held that Article 11(2)
of the U.N. Charter reserves the taking of enforcement action to the Security Council.
Id. at 164-65.
22. Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied
Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. 136, T 26 (July 9) (affirming that
the Security Council has primary but not exclusive responsibility for the maintenance of
international peace and security, and that the General Assembly also has "the power,
inter alia, under Article 14 of the Charter, to 'recommend measures for the peaceful
adjustment' of various situations").
23. See Lowe & Tzanakopoulos, supra note 7, 1 36; Reisman, Present Problems
of the Use ofForce in International Law, supra note 12, at 242-43.
24. U.N. Charter art. 51.
25. Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v.
U.S.), Judgment, 1986 I.C.J. 14, 1 191 (June 27); Iran v. U.S., 2003 I.C.J. 1 51.
26. Nicar. v. U.S., 1986 I.C.J. ¶ 194; Iran v. U.S., 2003 I.C.J. 1 43.
27. See Sean Murphy, The International Legality of US Military Cross-Border
Operations from Afghanistan into Pakistan, in THE WAR IN AFGHANISTAN: A LEGAL
ANALYSIS 109, 118 (Michael N. Schmitt ed., 2009); Michael Bahar, Power Through
Clarity: How Clarifying the Old State-Based Laws Can Reveal the Strategic Power of
Law, 30 U. PA. J. INT'L L. 1295, 1299 (2009); John Cerone, Misplaced Reliance on the
"Law of War", 14 NEw ENG. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 57, 59-61 (2007); Ashley S. Deeks,
Consent o the Use of Force and International Law Supremacy, 54 HARV. IN'L L.J. 1, 4
(2013); David Wippman, Military Intervention, Regional Organizations, and Host-State
Consent, 7 DuKE J. COMiP. & INT'L L. 209, 209 (1996) ('That consent may validate an
otherwise wrongful military intervention into the territory of the consenting state is a
generally accepted principle.").
28. Nicar. v. U.S., 1986 I.C.J. 1 246.
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case. 29 Moreover, the International Law Commission's Articles on
State Responsibility recognize consent as a means of precluding the
wrongfulness of an otherwise wrongful act.30
Aside from these three traditional exceptions to the prohibition on
the use of force, some scholars have asserted an exception of "protective
intervention," which has not gained universal support.3 ' Under this
theory, a state has the right to intervene militarily in the territory of
another state for the purpose of protecting its civilians.32 Some argue
that this exception is best assimilated into the exception of self-defense
under Article 51,33 whereas others posit that it does not constitute an
exception to the prohibition on the use of force at all.34
Humanitarian intervention is another proposed exception to the
prohibition on the use of force. As a matter of lex lata, most scholars
agree that humanitarian intervention does not have a legal basis in
international law. 35 Indeed, whenever the ICJ has broached the
prohibition on the use force, it has not left any room for an exception
based on humanitarian grounds. In Corfu Channel, the Court affirmed
the mandatory nature of the prohibition, specifying that the inabilities
of an international organization could not be invoked to justify
29. Dem. Rep. Congo v. Uganda, 2005 I.C.J. 11 92-105 (analyzing the situation
as if consent were a valid exception to the prohibition on the use of force).
30. International Law Commission, Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for
Internationally Wrongful Acts, with Commentaries, at 72, in Report of the International
Law Commission on the Work of Its Fifty-third Session, U.N. GAOR, 56th Sess., Supp.
No. 10, U.N. Doc. A/56/10 (2001). Note, however, that the debates in the International
Law Commission (ILC) indicate that most ILC members considered that the invocation
of consent to preclude the wrongfulness of military intervention should be determined
by the applicable primary rules, not by a secondary rule like Article 20. Gregory H. Fox,
Intervention by Invitation, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF THE USE OF FORCE IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 7, at 821; Georg Nolte, Intervention by Invitation, in
MAX PLANCK ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 1 16 (Jan. 2010).
31. See United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran (U.S. v. Iran),
Dissenting Opinion of Judge Morozov, 1980 I.C.J. Rep. 51, ¶ 8 (May 24) [hereinafter
Morozov's Dissent]; United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran (U.S. v.
Iran), Dissenting Opinion of Judge Tarazi, 1980 I.C.J. Rep. 64 (May 24) [hereinafter
Tarazi's Dissent]; CHARLES B. KEELY, HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION AND SOVEREIGNTY
9 (1995); ANTHONY CLARK AREND & ROBERT J. BECK, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE
OF FORCE 109-10 (1993); U.K. FOREIGN & COMMONWEALTH OFFICE, IS INTERVENTION
EVER JUSTIFIED?, FOREIGN POLICY DOCUMENT NO. 148, reproduced in United Kingdom
Materials on International Law 1986, 57 BRITISH Y.B. INT'L L. 487, 618 (1986)
[hereinafter U.K. FOREIGN & COMMONWEALTH OFFICE]; John R. D'Angelo, Note, Resort
to Force by States to Protect Nationals: The U.S. Rescue Mission to Iran and Its Legality
Under International Law, 21 VA. J. INT'L L. 485, 487 (1981).
32. U.K. FOREIGN & COMMONWEALTH OFFICE, supra note 31, at 618.
33. E.g., id. at 617-18.
34. Morozov's Dissent, supra note 31, at 1 8; Tarazi's Dissent, supra note 31.
35. Nigel Rodley, 'Humanitarian Intervention', in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF
THE USE OF FORCE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 7, at 775-76; Terry D. Gill,
Humanitarian Intervention, in THE HANDBOOK OF THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF MILITARY
OPERATIONS 221, 227 (Terry D. Gill & Dieter Fleck eds., 2010); Eric A. Heinze,
Humanitarian Intervention: Overview, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF HUMAN RIGHTS 443, 452
(David P. Forsythe ed., 2009).
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noncompliance.3 6 In Military and Paramilitary Activities, the Court
expressly held that humanitarian objectives cannot justify the use of
force under international law.3 7 In Nuclear Weapons, the Court seemed
to confirm the exclusive nature of the aforementioned exceptions.38 In
Oil Platforms, the Court affirmed the narrowness of the exception of
self-defense to the prohibition. 39 And, most recently, in Armed
Activities, the Court held that even Security Council resolutions
requiring states to bring peace and stability to a region could not justify
the use of force.40 In short, the ICJ's jurisprudence over the past seven
decades has reaffirmed the importance and nearly absolute nature of
the prohibition on the use of force.
B. The Responsibility to Protect
This is not to say, however, that concern for human rights has
completely disappeared. In fact, there is no question that, over the past
two decades, international human rights norms have gained
considerable traction. This development can most easily be seen in the
emergence of the Responsibility to Protect (R2P).
The history of R2P dates back to two tragic events in the mid-
1990s. In 1994, the United Nations and the rest of the international
community watched from the sidelines as the Hutu majority in
Rwanda slaughtered approximately eight hundred thousand
Rwandans over the course of a mere one hundred days.41 Then in 1995,
the international community once again stood idly by as the Bosnian
Serb Army of Republika Srpska massacred eight thousand Muslim
Bosniaks in Srebrenica within a mere ten days.42 In a 2000 report,
U.N. Secretary-General Kofi Annan asked, "if humanitarian
intervention is, indeed, an unacceptable assault on sovereignty, how
should we respond to a Rwanda, to a Srebrenica-to gross and
36. Corfu Channel (Alb. v. U.K.), Judgment, 1949 I.C.J. Rep. 4, 35 (Apr. 9).
37. Nicar. v. U.S., 1986 I.C.J. 1 268 ('The Court concludes that the argument
derived from the preservation of human rights in Nicaragua cannot afford a legal
justification for the conduct of the United States . . . .").
38. Legality of the Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996 I.C.J. 226,
1 38 (July 8).
39. Iran v. U.S., 2003 I.C.J. ¶ 43.
40. Dem. Rep. Congo v. Uganda, 2005 I.C.J. ¶ 152.
41. Rep. of the Independent Inquiry into the Actions of the United Nations
During the 1994 Genocide in Rwanda (1999), transmitted by Letter Dated 16 December
1999 from the Secretary-General Adressed to the President of the Security Council, at 3,
U.N. Doc. S/1999/1257 (Dec. 16, 1999).
42. Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the
Crime of Genocide (Bosn. & Herz. v. Serb. and Montenegro), Judgment, 2007 I.C.J. Rep.
43, ¶ 278 (Feb. 26); Prosecutor v. Krstid, Case No. IT-98-33-A, Judgment, ¶ 2 (Int'l Crim.
Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Apr. 19, 2004); see generally U.N. Secretary-General,
Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant o General Assembly Resolution 53/35: The
Fall of Srebrenica, U.N. Doc. A/54/549 (Nov. 15, 1999) (describing the events that
occurred in Srebrenica).
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systematic violations of human rights that offend every precept of our
common humanity?"43
Five months later, the Canadian government established the
International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty
(ICISS) in response to Secretary-General Annan's question. The
following year, ICISS released its report, entitled The Responsibility to
Protect, which, in a revolutionary fashion, argued that state
sovereignty implies not only certain rights but also the responsibility
of the state to protect its people.44 There a state fails to meet this
responsibility, the ICISS report argued, military intervention for
humanitarian purposes could be undertaken as "an exceptional and
extraordinary measure."45 The report, however, made it clear that such
intervention would require (1) Security Council authorization, (2)
General Assembly authorization under the Uniting for Peace
procedure, or (3) post hoc Security Council authorization for
intervention by a regional organization.46
Although subsequent U.N. reports endorsed the notion of R2P,
they took a more restrictive approach with regard to its application.
For example, in 2004, the Secretary-General's High-Level Panel
released the report A More Secure World, which restricted the
application of R2P to gross violations of human rights, and specified
that only the Security Council has the power to authorize military
intervention:
We endorse the emerging norm that there is a collective international
responsibility to protect, exercisable by the Security Council authorizing military
intervention as a last resort, in the event of genocide and other large-scale
killing, ethnic cleansing or serious violations of international humanitarian law
which sovereign Governments have proved powerless or unwilling to prevent.47
The Panel, however, accepted the possibility of post hoc Security
Council authorization in cases of intervention by a regional
organization:
Authorization from the Security Council should in all cases be sought for regional
peace operations, recognizing that in some urgent situations that authorization
may be sought after such operations have commenced.48
A few months later, the African Union, in a consensus document,
agreed with the Panel on this latter point:
43. U.N. SECRETARY-GENERAL, WE THE PEOPLES: THE ROLE OF THE UNITED
NATIONS IN THE 21ST CENTURY 48 (2000).
44. INT'L COMM'N ON INTERVENTION AND STATE SOVEREIGNTY, RESPONSIBILITY
TO PROTECT XI (Dec. 2001).
45. Id. at XII.
46. Id. at XII-XIII.
47. High Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, A More Secure World:
Our Shared Responsibility, ¶ 203, U.N. Doc. A/59/565 (Dec. 2, 2004) (emphasis added).
48. Id. I 272(a) (emphasis added).
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The African Union agrees with the Panel that the intervention of Regional
Organisations should be with the approval of the Security Council; although in
certain situations, such approval could be granted "after the fact" in
circumstances requiring urgent action.49
Nevertheless, subsequent reports did not address this question. In
Secretary-General Annan's 2005 report, entitled In Larger Freedom,
he stated:
[I]f national authorities are unable or unwilling to protect their citizens, then the
responsibility shifts to the international community to use diplomatic,
humanitarian and other methods to help protect the human rights and well-
being of civilian populations. When such methods appear insufficient, the
Security Council may out of necessity decide to take action under the Charter of
the United Nations, including enforcement action, if so required.50
This understanding that any humanitarian intervention would
require Security Council authorization remained intact in the
groundbreaking World Summit Outcome Document of 2005, which the
General Assembly unanimously adopted. The document provided:
In this context, we are prepared to take collective action, in a timely and decisive
manner, through the Security Council, in accordance with the Charter, including
Chapter VII, on a case-by-case basis and in cooperation with relevant regional
organizations as appropriate, should peaceful means be inadequate and national
authorities manifestly fail to protect their populations from genocide, war
crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity.51
Since 2009, Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon has published annual
reports on the Responsibility to Protect. For the most part, they have
reaffirmed the conclusions in the World Summit Outcome Document.
For example, in his 2009 report Implementing the Responsibility to
Protect, he stated:
The process of determining the best course of action, as well as of implementing
it, must fully respect the provisions, principles and purposes of the Charter. In
accordance with the Charter, measures under Chapter VII must be authorized by
the Security Council. The General Assembly may exercise a range of related
functions under Articles 10 to 14, as well as under the "Uniting for peace" process
set out in its resolution 377 (V).52
49. Executive Council, The Common African Position on the Proposed Reform of
the United Nations: "The Ezulwini Consensus", at 6, AU Doc. Ext/EX.CJ2(VII) (Mar. 8,
2005) (emphasis added).
50. U.N. Secretary-General, In Larger Freedom: Towards Development, Security
and Human Rights for All, T 135, U.N. Doc. A/59/2005 (Mar. 21, 2005) (emphasis added).
51. G.A. Res. 60/1, 1 139, 2005 World Summit Outcome (Sept. 16, 2005)
(emphasis added). The Security Council has on two occasions reaffirmed the conclusions
reached in this paragraph. See S.C. Res. 1674 (Apr. 28, 2006); S.C. Res. 1894 (Nov. 11,
2009).
52. U.N. Secretary-General, Implementing the Responsibility to Protect, ¶ 11(c),
U.N. Doc. A/63/677 (Jan. 12, 2009) (emphasis added).
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Nevertheless, in that very report, Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon
recognized that the General Assembly could potentially authorize a
Chapter VII enforcement action under the Uniting for Peace procedure:
[Clollective enforcement measures, including through sanctions or coercive
military action in extreme cases ... could be authorized by the Security Council
under Articles 41 or 42 of the Charter, by the General Assembly under the
"Uniting for peace" procedure ... or by regional or subregional arrangements
under Article 53, with the prior authorization of the Security Council.53
Since then, however, little emphasis has been placed on Uniting
for Peace. In his 2012 report on R2P, Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon
made it clear that "[o]nly the Security Council can authorize the use of
force, under Chapter VII, Article 42, of the Charter."54 And, in his most
recent report, released in July 2015, he once again suggested that only
the Security Council may authorize a forceful intervention.5 5
On the whole, the position of the U.N. Secretary-Generals on
R2P-although not entirely consistent over time-contains three
departures from the ICISS report. First, R2P applies only to gross
violations of human rights. Second, only the Security Council can
authorize military intervention. 56 And third, Security Council
authorization must be given before the military intervention takes
place, even for interventions by regional organizations. 5 Indeed,
Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon's 2009 report expressly rejected the
possibility of post hoc authorization.5 8
III. HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION
Although R2P and humanitarian intervention share the same
goal, they differ in one key respect: R2P requires the authorization of
the Security Council, or, at the very least, the General Assembly under
the Uniting for Peace procedure. Humanitarian intervention, on the
other hand, does not.
Generally speaking, a humanitarian intervention is any
intervention by a state, a group of states, or an international
organization into the territory of another state for the purpose of
ending human rights violations. This Article, however, employs the
53. Id. 1 56 (emphasis added).
54. U.N. Secretary-General, Responsibility to Protect: Timely and Decisive
Response, 1 32, U.N. Doc. A/66/874-S/2012/578 (July 25, 2012).
55. U.N. Secretary-General, A Vital and Enduring Commitment: Implementing
the Responsibility to Protect, J¶ 13, 43, U.N. Doc. A/69/981-S/2015/500 (July 13, 2015).
56. The principal exception is Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon's 2009 report. See
supra note 53 and accompanying text.
57. The principal exception is the High-Level Panel's 2004 report. See supra note
47 and accompanying text.
58. See supra note 52 and accompanying text.
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term humanitarian intervention-as many other scholars do5 9-to
refer to the subset of humanitarian interventions that (1) involve the
use of force, (2) aim to end gross violations of human rights, and (3) do
not fall under any of the traditional exceptions to the prohibition on
the use of force (i.e., Security Council authorization, self-defense, or
consent of the host state). In other words, humanitarian intervention
is the use of force by a state, a group of states, or an international
organization in the territory of another state for the purpose of ending
gross violations of human rights in the absence of a Security Council
authorization, a claim of self-defense, or the consent of the host state.
As it is generally accepted that humanitarian intervention is
unlawful as a matter of lex lata,60 commentators have proposed two
ways by which humanitarian intervention could become lawful conduct
under international aw. The first is through a reinterpretation of
Article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter in light of state practice. Under Article
31(3)(b) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, "any
subsequent practice in the application of the treaty which establishes
the agreement of the parties regarding its interpretation" shall be
taken into account in the interpretation of a treaty.6 1 Therefore, if
there is sufficient state practice showing that Article 2(4) should be
interpreted to allow for humanitarian intervention, then that
interpretation could hold.
The problem with this approach, however, is that there is a very
high standard for what qualifies as "subsequent practice . .. which
establishes the agreement of the parties."62 According to the Appellate
Body of the World Trade Organization, the subsequent practice would
have to be a "concordant, common and consistent sequence of acts or
59. E.g., Aoife O'Donoghue, Humanitarian Intervention Revisited, 1 HANSE L.
REV. 165 (2005); J. L. Holzgrefe, The Humanitarian Intervention Debate, in
HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION: ETHICAL, LEGAL, AND POLITICAL DILEMMAS 15, 18 (J. L.
Holzgrefe & Robert 0. Keohane eds., 2003); Daniel Wolf, Humanitarian Intervention, 9
MICH. Y.B. INT'L LEGAL STUD. 333, 334 n.3 (1988); Reisman, Present Problems of the Use
of Force in International Law, supra note 12, at 241-42; Lowe & Tzanakopoulos, supra
note 7, 1 3; GRAY, supra note 7, at 33-39. There are, of course, slight differences between
the definition used in this Article and the definitions used by these scholars. In
particular, some scholars use the term "humanitarian intervention" to include military
interventions authorized by the Security Council, and therefore distinguish between
"authorized" and "unauthorized" humanitarian interventions. This Article uses the term
"humanitarian intervention" to refer only to unauthorized humanitarian interventions.
60. See Rodley, supra note 35.
61. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 31(3)(b), May 23, 1969, 1155
U.N.T.S. 331.
62. IAN SINCLAIR, THE VIENNA CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF TREATIES 137 (2d
ed. 1984); Mustafa Kamil Yasseen, L'interpritation des traitis d'apis la convention de
Vienne sur le droit des traitis, 151 RECUEIL DES COURS 1, 48 (1976).
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pronouncements,"63 which most certainly does not describe the
infrequent "practice" of humanitarian intervention.64
Moreover, even if Article 31(3)(b) could be invoked to reinterpret
the treaty prohibition on the use of force, it could not facilitate the re-
interpretation of the customary prohibition on the use of force, which
the ICJ made clear in Military and Paramilitary Activities "retain[s] a
separate existence" from the treaty norm.65 Therefore, the possibility
of a reinterpretation of Article 2(4) to allow for the doctrine of
.humanitarian intervention is implausible.
The second way for humanitarian intervention to become lawful
conduct is through a new, supervening customary exception to the
prohibition on the use of force.66 It is to this possibility that this Article
now turns.
A. Humanitarian Intervention as a Customary Exception
As set forth in Article 38 of the ICJ Statute,67 and as the Court
has repeatedly recognized in its jurisprudence, 68 a norm reflects
customary international law if there is sufficient state practice
accompanied by the requisite opinio juris-the belief that "this practice
is rendered obligatory by the existence of a rule of law requiring it." 69
There is no steadfast rule concerning the amount of state practice
necessary to establish a rule of customary international law,70 but the
Court has noted that the practice must be "extensive"7 ' and "generally
accepted."7 2 Needless to say, the doctrine of humanitarian intervention
does not meet this standard.7 3
It must be recognized, however, that this formulation of
customary international law makes proving the customary nature of
certain rules much more difficult than others. In particular, it is
extremely difficult under this formulation to prove the customary
63. Appellate Body Report, Japan-Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages, 13-14, WTO
Doc. WT/DS8/AB/R (adopted Oct. 4, 1996); see Appellate Body Report, Chile-Price Band
System and Safeguard Measures Relating to Certain Agricultural Products, ¶ 272, WTO
Doc. WT/DS207/R (adopted Sept. 23, 2002).
64. See infra Sections III.B and III.C.
65. Nicar. v. U.S., 1986 I.C.J. 1 178.
66. Lowe & Tzanakopoulos, supra note 7, T 26.
67. Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 38(1)(b), June 26, 1945, 33
U.N.T.S. 993 [hereinafter ICJ Statute].
68. E.g., North Sea Continental Shelf (Ger.INeth.; Ger./Den.), Judgment, 1969
I.C.J. Rep. 3, T 77 (Feb. 20); Nicar. v. U.S., 1986 I.C.J. TT 183, 207.
69. Ger.fNeth.; Ger.fDen., 1969 I.C.J. T 77.
70. See Tullio Treves, Customary International Law, in MAX PLANCK
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW ¶f 35-40 (2006).
71. Ger.INeth.; Ger./Den., 1969 I.C.J. 1 74.
72. Fisheries Jurisdiction (U.K. v. Ice.), Judgment, 1974 I.C.J. Rep. 3, T 52 (July
25); Fisheries Jurisdiction (Ger. v. Ice.), Judgment, 1974 I.C.J. Rep. 175, 1 44 (July 25).
73. See infra Sections III.B and III.C.
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nature of an emerging exception to a customary prohibition, such as
the doctrine of humanitarian intervention. The reason is twofold.
First, states are strongly disincentivized from acting in accordance
with an emerging exception to a customary prohibition. The reason is
that every instance of such state practice-until the exception
definitively matures into a customary norm-would be a violation of
international law. Consequently, even if a state believed that the
exception should be law, it would still be discouraged from acting under
the exception out of fear of the consequences of breaching the
overarching norm. This phenomenon thus makes state practice of an
emerging customary exception rarer than it would be for other
emerging customary norms.
Second, even if a state acted in accordance with the exception, it
would be strongly disincentivized from framing its act as falling under
the exception, for the very same reason: the act would be considered a
violation of international law. As a result, the state would be inclined
to invoke other exceptions to the customary prohibition to justify its
actions. This phenomenon makes identifying state practice very
difficult.
Humanitarian intervention falls victim to both of these
phenomena. It is a proposed exception to the customary, and arguably
jus cogens 74 prohibition on the use of force. As a result, until a
sufficient portion of the international community agrees that
humanitarian intervention constitutes a customary norm, any act of
humanitarian intervention will be a violation of the prohibition on the
use of force. Consequently, states are strongly disincentivized to
engage in humanitarian intervention.7 5 And, in the rare cases that
they do, they are strongly incentivized to disguise it as falling under
one of the three traditional exceptions to the prohibition on the use of
force: Security Council authorization, self-defense, or consent of the
host state.
B. The History of Humanitarian Intervention
This dilemma is borne out by the history of humanitarian
intervention. The pre-Charter76 cases of humanitarian intervention
74. See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
75. See ERIC A. HEINZE, WAGING HUMANITARIAN WAR: THE ETHICS, LAW, AND
POLITICS OF HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION 74 (2009) ("Initial efforts to create new
customary international law .. . are necessarily illegal at the time that they occur, which
in the case of humanitarian intervention is to violate the prohibition on the use of force
. . . ."); Rodley, supra note 35, at 794 ("We are left with the conundrum that a rule of jus
cogens, a rule so important that it cannot be varied by treaty, has to be breached to pave
the way for an alternative rule. Such a paradigmatic paroxysm should not be lightly
presumed.").
76. Being pre-Charter cases, the relevant norm of international law was not the
prohibition on the use of force, but rather the principles of non-intervention and state
sovereignty.
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most commonly cited by commentators include the U.K., French, and
Russian intervention in Ottoman Greece in 1827; the French
intervention in Ottoman Syria from 1860 to 1861; and the U.S.
intervention in Cuba in 1898. 7 Nevertheless, in each case, the
intervening state or group of states never actually invoked
humanitarian intervention as its legal basis for intervention, but
rather relied on consent (Ottoman Greece78 and Ottoman Syria7 9), self-
defense (Cuba8 0), or other non-humanitarian grounds.81
Similarly, the post-Charter cases of humanitarian intervention
most commonly cited by commentators are the Indian intervention in
East Pakistan (Bangladesh) in 1971; the Tanzanian intervention in
Uganda in 1978; the Vietnamese intervention in Democratic
Kampuchea (Cambodia) in 1978; the French intervention in the
Central African Empire (Central African Republic) in 1979; the U.S.
intervention in Grenada in 1983; the U.S. intervention in Panama in
1989; the Economic Community of West African States' (ECOWAS)
intervention in Liberia in 1990; the U.S., U.K., and French no-fly zone
intervention in Iraq from 1991-2003; the ECOWAS intervention in
Sierra Leone in 1997; and the NATO intervention in Kosovo in 1999.82
Yet, once again, in each case, rather than invoking solely humanitarian
intervention as its justification, the intervening state, group of states,
or international organization invoked, or at least could have invoked,
one or more of the three traditional exceptions to the use of force:
Security Council authorization (Iraq and Kosovo),8 3 self-defense (East
77. See SIMON CHESTERMAN, JUST WAR OR JUST PEACE: HUMANITARIAN
INTERVENTION AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 28-34 (2001); IAN BROWNLIE, INTERNATIONAL
LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE BY STATES 339-40 (1963); Lowe & Tzanakopoulos, supra
note 7, 1 5.
78. See CHESTERMAN, supra note 77, at 29-32 (acknowledging that legal
justification was not humanitarian intervention, but that historians have purported
numerous motives to the action including "fear of unilateral intervention by Russia" and
public opinion forcing government action).
79. Id. at 33.
80. Id. at 34.
81. BROWNLIE, supra note 77, at 339-40 (1963); see CHESTERMAN, supra note
77, at 28-34; Lowe & Tzanakopoulos, supra note 7, ¶ 5.
82. Legality of Use of Force (Yugoslavia v. Belg.), Verbatim Record, CR 99/15,
at 16 (May 10, 1999); Lowe & Tzanakopoulos, supra note 7, ¶ 28.
83. Legality of Use of Force, Verbatim Record, CR 99/15, at 15 (May 10, 1999)
("[L]e Royaume de Belgique est d'avis que l'intervention arm6e trouve un fondement
sans conteste dans les r6solutions du Conseil de s6curitd que je viens de citer.") (Kosovo);
Lowe & Tzanakopoulos, supra note 7, 1 30 (Iraq), 1 32 (Kosovo); GRAY, supra note 7, at
36 (Iraq), 42-43, 45-47 (Kosovo); Stromseth, supra note 7, at 235 (Kosovo); Johnstone,
supra note 7, at 238-39 (Iraq), 239-43 (Kosovo). It should be noted that states have
invoked humanitarian intervention to justify a military intervention on three occasions,
but always alongside other justifications. First, in the Iraq case, the United Kingdom
argued that its action was justified by a doctrine of humanitarian intervention. GRAY,
supra note 7, at 37. However, the United Kingdom had first tried to bring its action under
the implied authorization of a Security Council resolution, id. at 36, and later also
invoked self-defense with respect to particular confrontations, id. at 37-38. Second, in
the Kosovo case, the U.K Permanent Representative to the United Nations put forth an
2017] 429
VANDERBIL TIOURNAL OF TRANSNA TIONAL LAW
Pakistan, Uganda, Democratic Kampuchea, and Iraq),84 and consent
of the host state (Grenada, Panama, Liberia, and Sierra Leone).85
The fact that the intervening states almost never actually invoked
the doctrine of humanitarian intervention to justify their military
interventions is critical. As the ICJ held in Military and Paramilitary
Activities,
[i]f a State acts in a way prima facie incompatible with a recognized rule, but
defends its conduct by appealing to exceptions or justifications contained within
the rule itself, then whether or not the State's conduct is in fact justifiable on
that basis, the significance of that attitude is to confirm rather than to weaken
the rule.86
And, as the Court later held in the same judgment,
[tihe significance for the Court of cases of State conduct prima facie inconsistent
with the principle of non-intervention lies in the nature of the ground offered as
justification. Reliance by a State on a novel right or an unprecedented exception
to the principle might, if shared in principle by other States, tend towards a
modification of customary international law. In fact however the Court finds that
argument of humanitarian intervention at the Security Council. U.N. SCOR, 54th Sess.,
3988th mtg, at 12, U.N. Doc. S/PV.3988 (Mar. 24, 1999) ("The action being taken is legal.
It is justified as an exceptional measures to prevent an overwhelming humanitarian
catastrophe.. . . In these circumstances, and as an exceptional measure on grounds of
overwhelming humanitarian necessity, military intervention is legally justifiable.").
Nevertheless, the Foreign Secretary and the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom had
instead relied on Security Council resolutions as their legal justification. Legality of Use
of Force (Yugoslavia v. U.K.), Verbatim Record, CR 99/14, at 36 (May 10, 1999);
Stromseth, supra note 7, at 236-37. Third, when the Kosovo case came before the ICJ,
Belgium argued that humanitarian intervention justified NATO's intervention. Legality
of Use of Force (Yugoslavia v. Belg.), Verbatim Record, CR 99/15, at 16 (May 10, 1999)
("[L]e Royaume de Belgique estime que c'est une intervention humanitaire arm6e qui est
compatible avec l'article 2, paragraphe 4 de la Charte qui ne vise que les interventions
dirig6es contre l'int6grit6 territoriale et l'ind6pendance politique de 1Etat en cause.").
However, Belgium advanced this argument only after first arguing that the basis of the
military intervention lied in Security Council resolutions. Legality of Use of Force
(Yugoslavia v. Belg.), Verbatim Record, CR 99/15, at 15 (May 10, 1999) ("[L]e Royaume
de Belgique est d'avis que l'intervention arm6e trouve un fondement sans conteste dans
les r6solutions du Conseil de securit6 que je viens de citer.").
84. GRAY, supra note 7, at 33, 38 (East Pakistan, Uganda, Democratic
Kampuchea, Iraq); Lowe & Tzanakopoulos, supra note 7, 1 29-30.
85. GRAY, supra note 7, at 49-50 (Liberia, Sierra Leone); Lowe &
Tzanakopoulos, supra note 7, 1 31 (Grenada, Panama); Simon M. Meisenberg, Sierra
Leone, in MAX PLANCK ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW T 9 (2013) (Sierra
Leone); Nolte, supra note 30, ¶¶ 4, 8 (Grenada, Panama, Liberia, Sierra Leone). Liberia
and Sierra Leone have also been characterized by commentators as falling under a
Security Council authorization, Lowe & Tzanakopoulos, supra note 7, N 29, in particular
a post hoc Security Council authorization, David Wippman, Pro-Democratic Intervention,
in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF THE USE OF FORCE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 7,
at 803-05 (Liberia, Sierra Leone); Rodley, supra note 35, at 775-76 (Liberia); Verena
Wiesner, Liberia, in MAX PLANCK ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW ¶1 29-
30 (2009) (Liberia); Meisenberg, supra note 85, 1 9 (Sierra Leone).
86. Nicar. v. U.S., 1986 I.C.J. 1 186.
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States have not justified their conduct by reference to a new right of intervention
or a new exception to the principle of its prohibition.87
Commentators have thus argued that, in light of the fact that the
intervening states almost never actually invoked the doctrine of
humanitarian intervention to justify their military interventions, the
numerous "examples" of humanitarian intervention mentioned above
cannot be used to support the existence of a customary norm of
humanitarian intervention. 88 True examples of humanitarian
intervention, these commentators argue, would be ones where the
intervening state, group of states, or international organization
actually invokes humanitarian intervention as its legal justification for
intervening. With this understanding, the requisite state practice and
opinio juris of humanitarian intervention would be sparse, if not
completely absent.8 9
C. Kosovo, Libya, and Syria
This traditional understanding of international law and
humanitarian intervention, however, has not stopped the academy
from publishing a plethora of articles on humanitarian intervention.
Indeed, after NATO's bombing of Kosovo, there was a massive
outpouring of law review articles evaluating the merits of the
doctrine. 90 Some scholars have even reached the conclusion that
Kosovo represents the only modern example of humanitarian
87. Id. ¶ 207 (emphasis added).
88. See, e.g., Lowe & Tzanakopoulos, supra note 7, 1 34; Sarvarian, supra note
9, at 30; Charney, supra note 9, at 1238-39; Tyagi, supra note 9, at 893; Hoffmann, supra
note 9, at 381.
89. See generally supra note 83.
90. E.g., William Moorman, Humanitarian Intervention and International Law
in the Case of Kosovo, 36 NEW ENG. L. REV. 775 (2002); Jens Elo Rytter, Humanitarian
Intervention Without the Security Council: From San Francisco to Kosovo - and Beyond,
70 NORDIC J. INT'L L. 121 (2001); Ove Bring, After Kosovo: NATO Should Formulate a
Doctrine on Humanitarian Intervention?, 10 U.S. A.F. ACAD. J. LEGAL STUD. 61 (2000);
Bartram S. Brown, Humanitarian Intervention at a Crossroads, 41 WM. & MARY L. REV.
1683 (2000); Laura Geissler, Law of Humanitarian Intervention and the Kosovo Crisis,
23 HAMLINE L. REV. 323 (2000); Vaughan Lowe, Commentary, International Legal Issues
Arising in the Kosovo Crisis, 49 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 934, 939-41 (2000); Julie Mertus,
Reconsidering the Legality of Humanitarian Intervention: Lessons from Kosovo, 41 WM.
& MARY L. REV. 1743 (2000); Sean D. Murphy, The Intervention in Kosovo: A Law-
shaping Incident?, 94 AM. SOC'Y INT'L L. PROC. 302, 302-04 (2000); Antonio Cassese, Ex
Iniuria Ius Oritur: Are We Moving Towards International Legitimation of Forcible
Humanitarian Countermeasures in the World Community?, 10 EUR. J. INT'L L. 23, 28-30
(1999); Christopher Greenwood, Humanitarian Intervention: The Case of Kosovo, 10
FINNISH Y.B. INT'L L. 141 (1999); Nico Schrijver, NATO in Kosovo: Humanitarian
Intervention Turns into Von Clausewitz War, 1 INT'L L.F. D. INT'L 155 (1999).
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intervention,9 ' despite the concerns critics raise regarding the lack of
express invocations of the doctrine.9 2
After Kosovo, however, the conversation on humanitarian
intervention slowed down. Excitement about the prospects of this new
purported doctrine of international law was tempered by
pronouncements from Germany and the United States that the NATO
bombing of Kosovo "must not become a precedent."93 And states did not
invoke the doctrine of humanitarian intervention to justify subsequent
engagements in military action.
Then came the Arab Spring, sparking instability and violence in
Libya and Syria, among other states. All of a sudden, the question of
humanitarian intervention came to the fore once again. In Libya, the
Muammar Qaddafi government began engaging in indiscriminate
massacres of civilians. 94 Many commentators thus saw Libya as a
promising case for humanitarian intervention. 9 Nevertheless, the
intervening states sought and ultimately received authorization from
the Security Council, thereby making Libya yet another case where a
military intervention fell under a traditional exception to the
prohibition on the use of force.96 The intervening states had no need to
invoke the doctrine of humanitarian intervention.
A similar story could be told about Syria. At first, scholars
clamored over how the doctrine of humanitarian intervention could be
invoked to stop the Syrian government from committing atrocities
against its own population.97 Then, as ISIL gained influence in the
region, commentators began supporting military action against the
terrorist organization." However, as described in Part I, all eleven
91. E.g., GRAY, supra note 7, at 48-50; HEINZE, supra note 75, at 76-77; Heinze,
supra note 35, at 452.
92. See supra note 83.
93. GRAY, supra note 7, at 47; see Klaus Kinkel, Minister of Foreign Affairs,
Statement Before the Federal Parliament (Oct. 16, 1998), in Deliberations of the
Deutshcer Bundestag, BT Plenarprotokolle 13/248, at 23127, reproduced in HEIKE
KRIEGER, THE Kosovo CONFLICT AND INTERNATIONAL LAW: AN ANALYTICAL
DOCUMENTATION 1974-1999 398-99 (2001).
94. See infra Section IV.B.
95. See Rachel E. VanLandingham, The Stars Aligned: The Legality, Legitimacy,
and Legacy of 2011's Humanitarian Intervention in Libya, 46 VALPARAISO U.L. REV. 859
(2012); Benjamin A. Valentino, The True Costs of Humanitarian Intervention: The Hard
Truth About a Noble Notion, 90 FOREIGN AFF. 60, 60 (2011).
96. See infra Section IV.B.
97. See, e.g., Michael Ignatieff, How to Save the Syrians, N.Y. REV. DAILY (Sept.
13, 2013), http://www.nybooks.comldaily/2013/09/13/how-save-syrians/ [https://perma
.cc/QM6N-82F2] (archived Feb. 4, 2017); Harold Hongju Koh, Syria and the Law of
Humanitarian Intervention (Part II: International Law and the Way Forward), JUST
SECURITY (Oct. 2, 2013), https://www.justsecurity.org/1506/koh-syria-part2/ [https://
perma.cclE9YU-JJYX] (archived Jan. 17, 2017).
98. See, e.g., Sourgens, supra note 1, at 404; Milena Sterio, The Applicability of
the Humanitarian Intervention Exception to the Middle Eastern Refugee Crisis: Why the
International Community Should Intervene Against ISIS, 38 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT'L L.
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states that have submitted letters to the United Nations justifying
military action against ISIL in Syria have invoked the right of self-
defense rather than the doctrine of humanitarian intervention. 9
Therefore, once again, the use of force falls under a traditional
exception to the prohibition on the use of force. Proponents of
humanitarian intervention are thus at a loss for true state practice and
opinio juris to support humanitarian intervention.
Yet even critics would admit that it would be a grave mistake to
disregard Kosovo, Libya, and Syria in a discussion on humanitarian
intervention. It is true that the intervening states ultimately relied on
a traditional exception to the use of force. But there is no question that
humanitarian motives were present in all three cases. And it would be
rational to surmise that humanitarian factors were a critical
consideration when the intervening states made the decision to engage
in forceful action. Indeed, in all three cases, commentators argued for
military action based on the doctrine of humanitarian intervention.
Therefore, although it would be inaccurate to cite these three cases as
actual examples of state practice and opinio juris supporting the
doctrine of humanitarian intervention, they are nonetheless incidents
that contribute to our understanding of international law. This is why
today it is not uncommon for commentators writing on humanitarian
intervention to focus on Kosovo, Libya, and Syria. 100
D. The Study of Incidents
Once it is acknowledged that the scope of analysis is broadened
beyond examples where intervening states expressly invoked
humanitarian intervention, further analysis is required. Over the past
decade, the international community has witnessed many incidents
where a state, a group of states, or an international organization
undertook or planned to undertake military intervention for
humanitarian purposes. Like Kosovo, Libya, and Syria, none of these
cases were clear examples of state practice and opiniojuris supporting
the doctrine of humanitarian intervention. But, as with Kosovo, Libya,
and Syria, it would be unwise to completely ignore these incidents.
Only through an examination of these incidents can one fully reflect on
the current status of humanitarian intervention under international
law.
REV. 325, 353-57 (2015); Jennifer Trahan, Pesky Questions of International Law: What's
the basis for Air Strikes in Syria?, OPINIo JURIS (Sept. 23, 2014), http://opiniojuris.org/
2014/09/23/guest-post-pesky-questions-international-law-whats-basis-air-strikes-syria
[https://perma.cclMSH2-SFUW] (archived Feb. 4, 2017).
99. See supra note 2.
100. E.g., Harold Hongju Koh, The War Powers and Humanitarian Intervention,
53 HOUS. L. REV. 971, 976-1004 (2016); Ilan Fuchs & Harry Borowski, The New World
Order: Humanitarian Intervention from Kosovo to Libya and Perhaps Syria?, 65
SYRACUSE L. REV. 303, 338-42 (2015).
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Indeed, relying solely on state practice and opiniojuris is an overly
formalistic way of understanding international law. The two
disincentives discussed above in Section II.A-the disincentive to
engage in humanitarian intervention and the disincentive to frame
acts as humanitarian interventions-must be taken into consideration.
When a state engages in a military intervention for humanitarian
purposes but invokes a traditional exception to the prohibition on the
use of force (especially an exception that does not fit very well with the
facts), it is still possible that the state was compelled to act by the
emerging norm of humanitarian intervention. If the system makes
state practice unlawful, how can one expect law-abiding states to
engage in the requisite state practice to make it lawful?
This Article aims to break through the formalism that has
impeded the acceptance of humanitarian intervention as a norm of
customary international law. Rather than trying to accumulate
examples of state practice and opinio juris to argue for the existence of
the customary norm, this Article undertakes an examination of
incidents.
First proposed by Professor W. Michael Reisman in 1984,101 the
study of incidents is an alternative approach to understanding
international law. Traditionally, international lawyers examine
primary and subsidiary sources of international law (treaties, custom,
general principles, judicial decisions, and scholarly writings) 102 to
identify the norms of international law and to determine whether a
given act violates .some preexisting norm. In the study of incidents,
however, the lawyer focuses his or her attention on specific incidents-
"overt conflict[s] between two or more actors in the international
system"1 0 3-and, more importantly, on the responses of key actors of
the international community to those incidents. It is incidents, rather
than the primary and subsidiary sources, that indicate and generate
the norms of international law. The question is therefore not whether
an act has violated some preexisting norm, but rather whether an act
is considered permissible by key actors of the international
community.104
The benefits of examining incidents are manifold. First, the
lawyer is no longer confined to the strict limits of the sources of
international law. Just because a certain norm has not achieved the
requisite state practice and opinio juris, or has not yet come before an
international court or tribunal, does not mean that it is completely
irrelevant. State conduct in conformity with the norm could still be
considered permissible by key actors in the system, giving the norm
101. W. Michael Reisman, International Incidents: Introduction to a New Genre
in the Study of International Law, 10 YALE J. INrL L. 1 (1984).
102. ICJ Statute, supra note 67, art. 38(1).
103. Reisman, supra note 101, at 12.
104. Id. at 4.
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some legal value. Second, the study of incidents is, in many ways, more
attuned to reality. Traditional conceptions of customary international
law and its formation obfuscate the dynamics of power, but an
examination of the reactions of key actors in the system to specific
incidents reveals these dynamics. Third, the study of incidents, in
particular the study of recent incidents, can reveal rapid changes in
international law that a study of the traditional sources of
international law is unable to capture. And fourth, most importantly,
the study of incidents allows for the expansion of the scope of research
beyond mere instances of state practice and opinio juris to any action
and/or reaction by states in international relations. This expansion
allows scholars to consider incidents like Kosovo, Libya, and Syria,
even if they are not, strictly speaking, cases of humanitarian
intervention.
Once the unit of inquiry becomes incidents rather than state
practice, the story of humanitarian intervention over the past decade
changes significantly. Not only do Kosovo, Libya, and Syria become
subjects of analysis, but many other incidents become critical for a
more comprehensive understanding of humanitarian intervention.
IV. RECENT INCIDENTS OF HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION
Over the past decade, there have been seven notable incidents of
humanitarian intervention. This Part examines these seven incidents
in turn. The purpose of this examination, unlike an examination of
state practice and opinio juris, is not to identify an emerging customary
norm of humanitarian intervention. Rather, the purpose is to use these
incidents as a prism to observe the reactions of key actors in the
international legal order, in order to ultimately determine what is
permissible under modern international legal practice. Consequently,
this Article makes no assertion that these incidents are representative
of military interventions today, nor does it need to. It merely asserts
that they provide a useful lens into how the international community
perceives the emerging norm of humanitarian intervention.
For each incident, the Article proceeds as follows. It first provides
the relevant background necessary to understanding the context of the
intervention. It then narrates the intervention, explains the asserted
legal justification for the intervention, and points out the problems
with the justification. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, it focuses
on the reactions of key actors in the international community to the
intervention. After examining all seven incidents, Part V of the Article
discusses the implications of the incidents for the doctrine of
humanitarian intervention.
20177 435
VANDERBILTJOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW
A. The Proposed IGAD Intervention in Somalia (2005-2006)
After the collapse of the Siad Barre regime in 1991, Somalia
entered into what one U.S. government official called "the worst
humanitarian crisis in the world."10 5 Within a mere two years, brutal
warfare between sixteen rival warlords and their factions'0o caused an
estimated three hundred thousand deaths, seven hundred thousand
refugees, and severe malnutrition among 4.5 million Somalis. 107 In
December 1992, the U.N. Security Council authorized the Unified Task
Force (UNITAF) to "use all necessary means to establish as soon as
possible a secure environment for humanitarian relief operations in
Somalia."s0 8 A series of early failures, however, led to the withdrawal
of UNITAF in May 1993.109
It was not until 2004 that significant progress was made towards
restoring stability to the war-torn nation. Under the auspices of the
then seven-nation Intergovernmental Authority on Development
(IGAD), Somali leaders meeting in Nairobi established a Transitional
Federal Parliament,1 1o which elected Abdullahi Yusuf as President in
October 2004. 11 President Yusufs new Transitional Federal
Government (TFG) had the support of the United Nations,12 but the
TFG's status as the legitimate Somali government was questionable
because, at the time of President Yusufs election, the TFG was still
105. Humanitarian Tragedy in Somalia: Hearing Before the H. Select Comm. on
Hunger, 102nd Cong. 100 (1992) (statement of Andrew S. Natsios, Assistant
Administrator, Bureau for Food and Humanitarian Assistance, U.S. Agency for
International Development); see Somalia: Beyond the Warlords, HUM. RTS. WATCH (Mar.
1, 1993), http://www.hrw.org/legacy/reports/1993/somalial [https://perma.cc/EGQ5-E5TC]
(archived Jan. 17, 2017).
106. THEODROS DAGNE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL30065, SOMALIA:
BACKGROUND AND U.S. INVOLVEMENT THROUGHOUT THE 1990s 2 (1999).
107. U.N. Secretary-General, Emergency Assistance for Humanitarian Relief and
the Economic and Social Rehabilitation of Somalia, 1 3, U.N. Doc. A/47/553 (Oct. 22,
1992); see loan Lewis & James Mayall, Somalia, in UNITED NATIONS INTERVENTIONISM,
1991-2004 120 (Mats Berdal & Spyros Economides eds., 2007).
108. S.C. Res. 794, 1 10 (Dec. 3, 1992).
109. See Lewis & Mayall, supra note 107, at 124-27.
110. U.N. Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary-General on the Situation in
Somalia, ¶ 7, U.N. Doc. S/2004/804 (Oct. 8, 2004).
111. U.N. Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary-General on the Situation in
Somalia, ¶ 2, U.N. Doc. S/2005/89 (Feb. 18, 2005).
112. See UN Officials Welcome Election of New President of Somalia, UN NEWS
CENTRE (Oct. 11, 2004), https://www.un.orglapps/news/story.asp?NewslD=12176&Cr=
Somalia&Crl#.WIFlkM6dLzKhttp://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=12176
&Cr=Somalia&Crl#.WHyYcrYrJE4 [https://perma.cc/E7DK-KTU2] (archived Jan. 17,
2017); Press Release, Secretary General, Secretary-General Says Inauguration of
Transitional President of Somalia is Hopeful Development After Country's Decade of
Problems, U.N. Press Release SG/SM/9541-AFR/1052 (Oct. 14, 2004).
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based in Nairobi11 3 and non-state armed groups continued to roam
Somali territory.114
Just eleven days after his inauguration, President Yusuf
requested that the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council
(PSC) provide a Peace Support Mission (PSM) of fifteen to twenty
thousand troops to help him reinstall the TFG in Somalia.1 15 As the
AU worked to develop this PSM (later called AMISOM), 116 the IGAD
developed a plan to deploy its own PSM (later called IGASOM) to help
the TFG relocate to Somalia. Plans for IGASOM moved much more
quickly than those for AMISOM, so that, by May 2005, the AU PSC
had authorized the deployment of Phase I of IGASOM with the
mandate of, inter alia, protecting the TFG and facilitating its
relocation to Somalia. 117 At the same time, the AU PSC expressly
requested that the Security Council lift the arms embargo on Somalia
in order to allow the deployment of IGASOM forces.1 18
The lawfulness of IGASOM, however, was questionable. First,
IGASOM did not have the unequivocal consent of the host state. Many
Somali leaders-even some affiliated with the TFG-opposed the
presence of foreign troops, especially troops from bordering states, on
the territory of Somalia.1 19 Moreover, it would have been difficult to
113. US Cheers Somali Govt's Relocation, PANAPRESS (June 22, 2005),
http://www.panapress.comfUS-cheers-Somali-govt-s-relocation-- 12-568147-32-lang1-
index.html [https://perma.cclVH2K-8FVD] (archived Jan. 17, 2017).
114. See Report of the Secretary-General on the Situation in Somalia, supra note
111, ¶ 17.
115. Id. 1 16.
116. The African Union Peace and Security Council requested the African Union
Commission to study President Yusuf's proposals and submit recommendations. Peace
and Security Council, Report of the Chairperson of the Commission on the Support of the
African Union to the Transitional Institutions of Somalia, ¶ 3, AU Doc. PSC/PR/2(XXII)
(Jan. 5, 2005). On January 5, the Chairperson of the Commission expressed his support
for the deployment of an African Union Peace and Support Mission (PSM) in Somalia to
protect the TFG in its relocation to Somalia. Id. 1 17. The African Union Peace and
Security Council accepted the deployment in principle, and requested the Commission
to submit more concrete recommendations. Peace and Security Council, Report of the
Chairperson of the Commission on the Outcomes of the Fact -finding/Reconnaissance
Mission to Somalia and the IGAD Military Planning Meetings, ¶ 1, AU Doc.
PSCPR/2(XXIX) (May 12, 2005).
117. Peace and Security Council, Communiqud of the Twenty-Ninth Meeting of
the Peace and Security Council, 1 4, AU Doc. PSC/PR/COMM(XXIX) (May 12, 2005)
[hereinafter Communiqud of the Twenty-Ninth Meeting of the Peace and Security
Council].
118. Id. 1 8.
119. U.N. Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary-General on the Situation in
Somalia, ¶¶ 4, 9-10, 19, U.N. Doc. S/2005/392 (June 16, 2005); Peace and Security
Council, Report of the Chairperson of the Commission on the Outcomes of the Fact-
finding/Reconnaissance Mission to Somalia and the IGAD Military Planning Meetings,
¶ 46, AU Doc. PSC/PRI2(XXIX) (May 12, 2005); CECILIA HULL & EMMA SVENSSON, FOI,
SWEDISH DEFENSE RESEARCH AGENCY, FOI-R--2596--SE, AFRICAN UNION MISSION IN
SOMALIA (AMISOM): EXEMPLIFYING AFRICAN UNION PEACEKEEPING CHALLENGES 23
(2008); Terry Mays, The Legitimacy of African Mandated Peacekeeping in Somalia, 2
MIL. LEGITIMACY & LEADERSHIP J. 54, 61 (2010); US Group Warns Choice ofPeacekeepers
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assert that the TFG was the legitimate representative of the Somali
people, as the TFG at the time was still located in Nairobi.120 Indeed,
commentators generally agree that consent by one faction in a civil
war, especially if that faction does not control all of the territory, is
insufficient to justify foreign military intervention.121
Second, neither the IGAD nor the AU ever sought Chapter VII
authorization for the IGASOM intervention. That is not to say that
they disregarded the United Nations entirely. When requesting the
mandate for IGASOM from the AU, the IGAD had "expressed [its] hope
that ultimately the mandate will be endorsed by the United
Nations."122 And when authorizing IGASOM, the AU PSC had called
upon the United Nations to "provide support" for IGASOM. 123
Moreover, as mentioned above, when authorizing Phase I of IGASOM
in May, the AU PSC had requested the U.N. Security Council to
exempt IGASOM from the Somali arms embargo.124 But neither the
IGAD nor the AU ever expressly requested that the U.N. Security
Council authorize the use of force by the IGAD under Chapter VII.
The reaction of the international community to IGASOM was, on
the whole, not very positive. Although the AU and the IGAD had
endorsed the deployment of IGASOM forces, Secretary-General Kofi
Annan warned that, if IGASOM went "beyond peacekeeping and
involve [d] peace enforcement, a Security Council approval must be
sought."125 And although the European Union appeared to accept the
deployment of IGASOM subject to certain conditions,126 the United
to Somalia, PANAPRESs (Feb. 10, 2005), http://www.panapress.comiUS-group-warns-on-
choice-of-peacekeepers-to-Somalia--12-563072-32-lang2-index.html [https://perma.cc/R4MH-
DBX4] (archived Jan. 17, 2017); Somali MPs oppose involvement of frontline states in
peacekeeping, PANAPRESS (Mar. 15, 2005), http://www.panapress.com/Somali-MPs-
oppose-involvement-of-frontline-states-in-peacekeeping-- 12-564561-32-lang1-
index.html [https://perma.cclWT86-B2TG] (archived Jan. 17, 2017).
120. U.N. Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary-General on the Situation in
Somalia, T 2, U.N. Doc. S/2005/392 (June 16, 2005).
121. Oscar Schachter, The Right of States to Use Armed Force, 82 MICH. L. REV.
1620, 1645 (1984); GRAY, supra note 7, at 81; U.K. FOREIGN & COMMONWEALTH OFFICE,
supra note 31, at 616; Nolte, supra note 30, 1 18.
122. Intergovernmental Authority on Development, Communiqud of the IGAD
Heads of State and Government on Somalia, I vi (Jan. 31, 2005),
https://igad.int/communique/1351-communique-of-the-28th-igad-extra-ordinary-
summit-on-somalia [https://perma.cclE5JP-A8SY] (archived Mar. 5, 2017).
123. Peace and Security Council, Communique of the Twenty-Fourth Meeting of
the Peace and Security Council, ¶ A(5), AU Doc. PSC/PRICOMM(XX[V) (Feb. 7, 2005).
124. Communiqud of the Twenty-Ninth Meeting of the Peace and Security Council,
supra note 117, ¶ 8.
125. U.S. Opposes Somalia Troops Deployment, Threatens Veto, PANAPRESS (Mar.
17, 2005), http://www.panapress.com/US-opposes-Somalia-troops-deployment,-threatens-
veto--12-564668-32-langl-index.html [https://perma.cc/GGP5-T9GG] (archived Jan. 17,
2017) [hereinafter U.S. Opposes Somalia Troops Deployment].
126. See European Commission Press Release P/05/35, 7877/05, Council of the
European Union, Declaration by the Presidency on behalf of the European Union on
Somalia (Apr. 7, 2005), http://europa.eu/rapid/press-releasePESC-05-35_en.htm
[https://perma.cc/3ZLW-PYJV] (archived Jan. 16, 2017); EU Urges Consensus in Somali
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States suggested that it would veto any Security Council Resolution
authorizing IGASOM, stating that, "[w]hile we appreciate IGAD's
intentions of stabilising Somalia, we do not understand the rationale
behind the IGAD deployment plan . . 127 The final verdict, however,
came out in July 2005, when the Security Council rejected the AU
PSC's request to lift the arms embargo. 128 Although the Security
Council had on paper "commend[ed]" the IGAD and "welcom[ed]" its
planned deployment of IGASOM in Somalia,129 its refusal to lift the
embargo effectively prevented the deployment of IGASOM.
Over a year and a half later, in December 2006, the Security
Council did finally exempt IGASOM from the embargo and authorize
the mission under Chapter VII.1 30 However, IGASOM never actually
deployed because of internal Somali opposition, the lack of troops, and
funding problems. 131
B. The NATO Intervention in Libya (2011)
In February 2011, inspired by anti-government protests sweeping
across the Middle East and North Africa, Libyans began organizing
protests against the Muammar Qaddafi government.1 3 2 Qaddafi forces
responded brutally with enforced disappearances and indiscriminate
killings of civilians, 13 3 leading the U.N. Human Rights Council to
conclude that the Qaddafi government had been committing "gross and
systematic human rights violations" against its own civilians.134
Peace Process, PANAPRESS (Apr. 11, 2005), http://www.panapress.com/EU-urges-
consensus-in-Somali-peace-process-- 12 565840-32-langl-index.html
[https://perma.cc/9MSU-4PQQ] (archived Jan. 16, 2017).
127. IGAD approves Ugandan, Sudanese peacekeepers for Somalia, PANAPRESS
(Mar. 18, 2005), http://www.panapress.comliGAD-approves-Ugandan,-Sudanese-
peacekeepers-for-Somalia--12-564754-32-langl-index.html [https://perma.cc/8PUN-
2GCF] (archived Jan. 16, 2017); U.S. Opposes Somalia Troops Deployment, supra note
125; Mays, supra note 119, at 56-57.
128. S.C. Pres. Statement 2005/32, at 2 (July 14, 2005).
129. Id.
130. S.C. Res. 1725, T 3 (Dec. 6, 2006).
131. HULL & SVENSSON, supra note 119, at 24-25.
132. The Battle for Libya: Killings, Disappearances and Torture, AMNESTY INT'L,
(Al Index MDE 19/025/2011), Sept. 13, 2011, at 7 [hereinafter The Battle for Libya:
Killings, Disappearances and Torture].
133. See Mehrdad Payandeh, The United Nations, Military Intervention, and
Regime Change in Libya, 52 VA. J. INT'L L. 355, 372 (2012); see also, The Battle for Libya:
Killings, Disappearances and Torture, supra note 132, at 7-S.
134. U.N. Human Rights Council, Situation of Human Rights in the Libyan Arab
Jamahiriya, at 2, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/S-15/NGO/1 (Feb. 25, 2011).
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By mid-March, the Arab League, 135 the Gulf Cooperation
Council, 136 the Secretary-General of the Organisation of Islamic
Cooperation,1 37 and various states13 8 had called on the U.N. Security
Council to impose a no-fly zone over Libya. After the humanitarian
situation significantly worsened in the first half of March, the U.N.
Security Council-with China, Russia, Brazil, Germany, and India
abstaining1 3 -adopted Resolution 1973. Resolution 1973 authorized
U.N. Member States to take "all necessary measures ... to protect
civilians and civilian populated areas"140 and "all necessary measures
to enforce compliance with"141 a no-fly zone established to "help protect
civilians."14 2
Two days later, the United States, the United Kingdom, and
France commenced military operations in Libya, which NATO took
over soon after.14 3 The NATO forces destroyed the Libyan air defense
and air force within days, 144 and carried out multiple attacks on
Qaddafi's control centers in Tripoli over the next couple of months.1 45
By August 2011, the NATO forces had helped the Libyan rebels gain
135. See Letter from Yahya Mahmassani, Permanent Observer of the League of
Arab States to the United Nations to the President of the Security Council, The
Implications of the Current Events in Libya and the Arab Position, U.N. Doc. S/2011/137
(Mar. 14, 2011) (annexed) (calling upon the U.N. Security Council to "take the measures
necessary to immediately impose a no-fly zone on Libyan military aircraft. . .").
136. Wissam Keyrouz, Gulf States Back Libya No-fly Zone, AGENCE FRANCE
PRESSE (Mar. 8, 2011) ("demand[ing] that the UN Security Council take all necessary
measures to protect civilians, including enforcing a no-fly zone over Libya.").
137. Press Release, Organisation of the Islamic Conference, Ihsanoglu Support
No-Fly Decision at OIC Meeting on Libya, Calls for an Islamic Humanitarian
Programme in and Outside Libya (Mar. 8, 2011), http://www.Icil.cam.ac.uk/sites/default/
files/LCIIdocuments/arabspring/ibya/Libya15 jIhsanogluSupport.pdf
[https://perma.ccYX2X-W2CB] (archived Feb. 4, 2017).
138. See Libya: UK and French No-fly Zone Plan Gathers Pace, BBC (Mar. 8,
2011), http://www.bbc.comlnews/world-africa-12672640 [https://perma.cc/68FQ-6YT3]
(archived Jan. 23, 2017); S.C. Res. 85, 1 7 (Mar. 1, 2011).
139. Press Release, Security Council, Security Council Approves 'No-fly Zone'
Over Libya, Authorizing 'All Necessary Measures' to Protect Civilians, U.N. Press
Release SC/10200 (Mar. 17, 2011).
140. S.C. Res. 1973, 1 4 (Mar. 17, 2011).
141. Id. 1 8.
142. Id. 1 6.
143. JEREMIAH GERTLER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R41725, OPERATION ODYSSEY
DAWN (LIBYA): BACKGROUND AND ISSUES FOR CONGRESS, summary, 7, 17-18 (2011);
Mikael Eriksson, Towards Selective Regionalization?: The Intervention in Libya and the
Emerging Global Order, in REGIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND PEACEMAKING: CHALLENGERS
TO THE UN? 217, 228 (Peter Wallensteen & Anders Bjurner eds., 2015); Mehrdad
Payandeh, The United Nations, Military Intervention, and Regime Change in Libya, 52
VA. J. INT'L L. 355, 378-79 (2012).
144. See Libyan Air Force 'No Longer Exists', AL JAZEERA (Mar. 23, 2011),
http://www.aljazeera.com/news/africa/2011/03/201132316258646677.html
[https://perma.ccfMVY9-5MSJ] (archived Feb. 4, 2017).
145. See Payandeh, supra note 143, at 379.
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control over Tripoli. 146 The legality of these actions, however, was
questionable: commentators largely agree that NATO overstepped its
mandate by pushing for regime change rather than simply civilian
protection.147
The reaction of the international community, aside from those
who participated in the intervention, was also largely negative. Just
days after the intervention began, the BRICS states (Brazil, Russia,
India, China, and South Africa), 148 the Arab League,149 the AU,15 0 and
other Latin American states'5 began criticizing the Western powers
for exceeding the Security Council mandate. In response, NATO
Secretary General Anders Rasmussen,152 U.N. Secretary-General Ban
Ki-moon,15 3 and others argued that NATO operations had remained
146. Kareem Fahim & David D. Kirkpatrick, Jubilant Rebels Control Much of
Tripoli, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 21, 2011, at Al.
147. See Ramesh Thakur, The Use of International Force to Prevent or Halt
Atrocities: From Humanitarian Intervention to the Responsibility to Protect, in THE
OXFORD HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW 815, 833-34 (2013) ("[T]he
insistence by some NATO powers that they fully adhered to the UN-authorized 'all
necessary measures' to protect civilians and civilian-populated areas, is not credible.");
Graham Cronogue, Responsibility to Protect: Syria The Law, Politics, and Future of
Humanitarian Intervention Post-Libya, 3 J. INT'L HUMAN. LEGAL STUD. 124, 128, 144-
45 (2012); Robert Naiman, Surprise War for Regime Change in Libya is the Wrong Path,
FOREIGN POL'Y IN Focus (Apr. 4, 2011), http://fpif.org/surprise-war-for-regime-change
in_1ibya is the wrong-path/ [https://perma.cclESE8-ZJB8] (archived Jan. 23, 2017].
148. Oliver Stuenkel, The BRICS and the Future of R2P: Was Syria or Libya the
Exception?, 6 GLOBAL RESP. TO PROTECT 3, 17-18 (2014); Kenneth Rapoza, No Obama
Support from Brazil, Russia, China on Libya Front, FORBES (Mar. 25, 2011),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/kenrapoza/2011/03/25/no-obama-support-from-brazil-
russia-china-on-libya-front/ [https://perma.cclRRM4-BLLF] (archived Feb. 4, 2017);
Palash Ghosh, Putin Downplays Alleged Tiff with Medvedev over Libya, INT'L Bus. TIMES
(Mar. 22, 2011), http://www.ibtimes.com/putin-downplays-alleged-tiff-medvedev-over-
libya-276727 [https://perma.ccl6HWR-Z84E] (archived Jan. 23, 2017); Chris Buckley,
China Intensifies Condemnation of Libya Air Strikes, REUTERS (Mar. 21,
2011), http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/03/21/us-china-libya-idUSTRE72KOLX2011
0321 [https://perma.cclZ72P-ZMZ7] (archived Feb. 4, 2017).
149. See Martin Beckford, Libya Attacks Criticised by Arab League, China,
Russia and India, THE TELEGRAPH (Mar. 21, 2011), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/
news/worldnews/africaandindianocean/libya/8393950/Libya-attacks-criticised-by-Arab-
League-China-Russia-and-India.html [https:/perma.cc/
BG6C-FTLX] (archived Feb. 4, 2017); Interview with Amr Moussa, The Goal in Libya Is
Not Regime Change, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 23, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/24/
opinion/24iht-edmoussa24.html [https://perma.cclGKQ6-63FF] (archived Feb. 4, 2017).
150. See Libya: AU Opposes Foreign Military Intervention in Libya, ALLAFRICA
(Mar. 20, 2011) http://allafrica.com/stories/201103200012.html [https://perma.cc/ED6C-
7AAF] (archived Feb. 4, 2017).
151. See Latin American Leaders React to Libya Conflict, AMERICAS Q. (Mar. 23,
2011), http://www.americasquarterly.org/node/2341 [https://perma.cc/FKX4-6KTE]
(archived Jan. 23, 2017).
152. Questions and Answers at the Press Conference by NATO Secretary General
Anders Fogh Rasmussen, NATO (Apr. 15, 2011), http://www.nato.int/cps/en/
natolive/opinions_108709.htm [https://perma.cclX3JS-3H9E] (archived Mar. 5, 2017).
153. Louis Charbonneau, U.N. Chief Defends NATO from Critics of Libya War,
REUTERS (Dec. 14, 2011), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-libya-nato-un-idUSTRE7B
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infra legem the Resolution because the only way of "protecting
civilians" was to topple the Qaddafi government. 154 Indeed, as early as
April 2011, President Obama, President Sarkozy, and Prime Minister
Cameron wrote a joint editorial recognizing the limits of Resolution
1973 but nonetheless stating that "it is impossible to imagine a future
for Libya with Qaddafi in power" and that it is "unthinkable that
someone who has tried to massacre his own people can play a part in
their future government."155
Nevertheless, most commentators agree that NATO had gone
beyond the mandate. 156 And it could be argued that the Libya
intervention had a negative impact on the development of R2P. In a
concept note sent to the U.N. Security Council in November 2011,
Brazil stated that "there is a growing perception that the concept of the
responsibility to protect might be misused for purposes other than
protecting civilians, such as regime change."1 57
C. The UNOCI/French Intervention in C6te d'Ivoire (2011)
Another case where an intervening state allegedly overstepped a
Chapter VII mandate can be seen in C6te d'Ivoire in 2011. A dispute
over the results of presidential elections in November 2010 had led to
a humanitarian crisis: supporters of the incumbent, Laurent Gbagbo,
and supporters of the opposition candidate, Alassane Ouattara,
engaged in violent clashes and committed widespread human rights
abuses.15 8 By March 2011, amidst the humanitarian crisis, forces loyal
to Mr. Ouattara had taken over most of the country, but Mr. Gbagbo
maintained control of the capital Abidjan.
On March 30, 2011 the U.N. Security Council unanimously
adopted Resolution 1975. The Resolution reiterated the Security
Council's authorization for the U.N. Operation in C6te d'Ivoire
(UNOCI) to "use all necessary means ... to protect civilians under
imminent threat of physical violence."'5 9 Although the Resolution, as
well as key sectors of the international community, had recognized Mr.
D20C20111214 (subscription required) [https://perma.cclZ5FG-JQV5] (archived Mar. 5,
2017).
154. See Payandeh, supra note 143, at 387-89.
155. Barack Obama, David Cameron & Nicolas Sarkozy, Editorial, Libya's
Pathway to Peace, INT'L HERALD TRTB. (Apr. 15, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/04/
15/opinion/15iht-edlibyal5.html [https://perma.cc/Z8F4-RV6M] (archived Mar. 5, 2017).
156. See Thakur, supra note 147; see also Cronogue, supra note 147.
157. Permanent Rep. of Brazil to the U.N., Letter dated Nov. 9, 2011 from the
Permanent Rep. of Brazil to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General,
U.N. Doc. S/2011/70.1 (Nov. 11, 2011).
158. U.N. Secretary-General, Twenty-seventh Progress Report of the Secretary-
General on the United Nations Operation in C6te d'Ivoire, if 53, 61, U.N. Doc. S/2011/211
(Mar. 30, 2011) [hereinafter Twenty-seventh Progress Report of the Secretary-General].
159. S.C. Res. 1975, } 6 (Mar. 30, 2011).
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Ouattara as the victor of the elections, 160 the Resolution did not
authorize the use of military force to ensure his accession to power.161
Heavy fighting broke out in Abidjan the following day and Mr.
Gbagbo's forces began shelling civilians in pro-Ouattara areas of
Abidjan, as well as U.N. forces, which UNOCI later considered as a
"possible crime against humanity." 162 A few days later, U.N. and
French helicopters arrived, and began firing at pro-Gbagbo military
installations.1 6 3 On April 11, as forces loyal to Mr. Ouattara closed in
on Mr. Gbagbo's bunker in the presidential residence, UNOCI and
French attack helicopters targeted the heavy weapons used by his
forces.164 That afternoon, Mr. Ouattara's forces managed to enter the
residence and arrest Mr. Gbagbo.
Once again, one can question the lawfulness of this final offensive
operation. As in Libya, the Security Council Resolution only authorized
the use of "all necessary means" to "protect civilians." As a result, the
participation of UNOCI and France in the offensive attacks and final
siege on Mr. Gbagbo's forces arguably went beyond the mandate.165
And, as in Somalia, although Mr. Ouattara impliedly consented to
UNOCI and French support, it is not clear whether Mr. Ouattara had
the authority to authorize the intervention, given the divided state of
the country at the time.
Nevertheless, the reaction of the international community was
largely positive. At the meeting of the Security Council two days later,
the Special Representative of the Secretary-General and head of
UNOCI called the incident "a success story," and praised France for
"its most helpful cooperation." 166 The Secretary-General in his
subsequent report later argued, as NATO argued in Libya, that
160. The United Nations, the African Union, the Economic Community of West
African States (ECOWAS), the European Union, the United States, France, and other
states recognized Mr. Ouattara as the victor. See NICOLAS COOK, CONG. RESEARCH
SERV., RS21989, C)TE D'IVOIRE POST-GBAGBO: CRISIS RECOVERY 1 (2011); Twenty-
seventh Progress Report of the Secretary-General, supra note 158, J 22-24.
161. The Resolution did, however, "[u]rg[e] all ... parties ... to respect ... the
election of Alassane Dramane Ouattara as President." S.C. Res. 1975, 1 1 (Mar. 30,
2011).
162. Pierre Schori, ECOWAS and the AU in Cooperation with the UN: The Case
of C6te d'Ivoire, in REGIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND PEACEMAKING: CHALLENGERS TO THE
UN? 160, 169 (Peter Wallensteen & Anders Bjurner eds., 2015).
163. Adam Nossiter, Strikes by U.N. and France Corner Leader of Ivory Coast,
N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 4, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/04/05/worldlafrica/05ivory.
html?_r=1 [https://perma.cc/R8BL-ZY8R] (archived Jan. 23, 2017).
164. Schori, supra note 162, at 169.
165. Thabo Mbeki, What the World Got Wrong in Cote d'Ivoire, FOREIGN POLY
(Apr. 29, 2011), http://foreignpolicy.com/2011/04/29/what-the-world-got-wrong-in-cote-
divoirel [https://perma.cc/64VN-LNRX] (archived Mar. 5, 2017); Russia Lashes Out at
UN Military Action in Cote d'Ivoire, RuSSIA TODAY (Apr. 5, 2011), https://www.rt.com/
news/cote-ivoire-gbagbo-un/ [https://perma.cclJ479-9LUE] (archived Mar. 5, 2017).
166. U.N. SCOR, 66th Sess., 6513th mtg. at 2, U.N. Doc. S/PV.6513 (Apr. 13,
2011).
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attacking Mr. Gbagbo's forces was necessary to protect civilians. 167
And the Chef de Cabinet of the Secretary-General pointed out: "[t]he
impartiality of the United Nations does not mean neutrality. Its
peacekeepers had a responsibility to act in the face of possible grave
violations of human rights and international humanitarian law." 168
Support was not unanimous, however. The Russian Minister of
Foreign Affairs'6 9 and the Chairman of the AUo70 argued that France
had exceeded its mandate. As a BBC U.N. correspondent stated,
"[w]hat is clear is that if the UN continues to sanction military
interventions in national conflicts, there will be continuing questions
about whether it is acting to protect civilians, or using humanitarian
justifications as a smokescreen to force political change."1 7 '
D. The French Intervention in Mali (2013)
In January 2012, armed with an influx of weapons from Libya,
Tuareg rebels in northern Mali began a military campaign against the
Malian government. 172 After a military coup in March 2012, the
Tuareg rebels proclaimed the independence of Azawad,173 a northern
territory that comprises approximately sixty percent of Mali's total
land area. The resultant political instability facilitated the rapid
growth of armed Islamist groups in the region.174 By July 2012, the
Islamists had pushed out the Tuareg rebels and had taken over
northern Mali.17 5
Under Islamist control, the humanitarian situation in the region
underwent a "drastic deterioration."176 Several armed Islamist groups
began imposing sharia law on the local population, punishing violators
167. U.N. Secretary-General, Twenty-eighth Report of the Secretary-General on
the United Nations Operation in C6te d'Ivoire, ¶¶ 5-9, U.N. Doc. S/2011/387 (June 24,
2011).
168. Schori, supra note 162, at 175.
169. Id. at 169.
170. Id. at 170.
171. Barbara Plett, Did UN forces take sides in Ivory Coast?, BBC (Apr. 7, 2011),
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-13004462 [https://perma.cc/87KW-6DJ5] (archived
Jan. 23, 2017).
172. See Scott Stewart, Mali Besieged by Fighters Fleeing Libya, STRATFOR (Feb.
2, 2012), https://www.stratfor.com/weekly/mali-besieged-fighters-fleeing-libya [https://
perma.ccD6ED-SV3L] (archived Jan. 23, 2017).
173. Stuart Casey Maslen, Armed Conflict in Mali in 2013, in THE WAR REPORT:
ARMED CONFLICT IN 2013 147, 148 (Stuart Casey Maslen ed., 2014).
174. See WORLD REPORT 2013, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH 134; U.N. Human Rights
Council, Report of the Independent Expert on the Situation of Human Rights in Mali,
Suliman Baldo, ¶ 9, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/25/72 (Jan. 10, 2014) [hereinafter WORLD REPORT
2013].
175. See Adam Nossiter, Jihadists'Fierce Justice Drives Thousands to Flee Mali,
N.Y. TIMES (July 7, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/07/18/worldlafrica/jidhadists-
fierce-justice-drives-thousands-to-flee-mali.html [https://perma.cclEA49-J723] (archived
Mar. 5, 2017).
176. WORLD REPORT 2013, supra note 174, at 134.
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through public beatings, floggings, and summary executions.'7 7 On
July 17th, the Human Rights Council adopted a resolution condemning
the human rights violations and acts of violence committed in northern Mali, in
particular by the rebels, terrorist groups and other organized transnational
crime networks, including the violence perpetrated against women and children,
the killings, hostage-takings, pillaging, theft and destruction of religious and
cultural sites, as well as the recruitment of child soldiers, and calls for the
perpetrators of these acts to be brought to justice . . .178
In response, in November 2012, ECOWAS adopted a Concept of
Operations for the deployment of an African-led International Support
Mission in Mali (later called AFISMA), requested that the AU PSC
endorse it, and "urge[d] the Security Council to examine the Concept
with a view to authorizing the deployment of the international military
force in Mali." 1 79 In endorsing the Concept, the AU PSC likewise
"urge[d] the UN Security Council ... to authorize . .. the planned
deployment of AFISMA." 8 0 Pursuant to these requests, in December
2012, the U.N. Security Council unanimously adopted Resolution 2085,
which authorized AFISMVA to take "all necessary measures," inter alia,
to recover the northern territories of Mali from the rebels. 181 The
Resolution also "[u]rge[d] Member States . . . to provide coordinated
support ... and any necessary assistance [to AFISMA] in efforts to
reduce the threats posed by terrorist organizations."'8 2
For logistical and financial reasons, however, AFISMA could not
be deployed immediately.1 83 This proved problematic, as, within a few
weeks of the Resolution, Islamist rebels made significant advances
against government forces.184 After the rebels captured the strategic
town of Konna on January 10th, the Transitional Government formally
requested that France come to its assistance.85 That same day, the
U.N. Security Council issued a press statement "reiterat[ing] their call
to Member States to . . . provide assistance to the Malian Defence and
177. Id. at 136.
178. Human Rights Council Res. 20/17, 1 2 (July 17, 2012).
179. Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), Final
Communiqud of the Extraordinary Session of the Authority of ECOWAS Heads of State
and Government, 1 9 (Nov. 11, 2012).
180. Peace and Security Council, Communiqu6 of the 341st Meeting of the Peace
and Security Council, 1 9, AU Doc. PSC/PRICOMM.2(CCCXLI) (Nov. 13, 2012).
181. S.C. Res. 2085, ¶ 9 (Dec. 20, 2012).
182. Id. 1 14.
183. See Abiodun Joseph Oluwadare, The African Union and the Conflict in Mali:
Extra-Regional Influence and the Limitations of a Regional Actor, 6 J. INT'L & GLOBAL
STUD. 106, 114-15 (2014); see also Jair van der Lijn & Xenia Avezov, Peace Operations
in Africa, in SIPRI YEARBOOK 2014: ARMAMENTS, DISARMAMENT AND INTERNATIONAL
SECURITY 110, 114 (2014).
184. U.N. Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary-General on the Situation in
Mali, ¶¶ 3-4, U.N. Doc. S/2013/189 (Mar. 26, 2013).
185. Id. ¶ 3.
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Security Forces in order to reduce the threat posed by terrorist
organizations and associated groups."18 6
The next day, France launched Operation Serval, a military
operation aimed at ousting the Islamic militants. At a press conference,
the French Minister of Foreign Affairs justified the legality of the
intervention by invoking Security Council authorization, the consent
of the Malian authorities, and Article 51 self-defense.1 87 With regards
to the self-defense justification, France's Minister of Defense explained
the following day that France was compelled to act because it could not
allow "a terrorist state at the doorstep of France and Europe."18 8
Nevertheless, one can again question the validity of these
justifications. First, although Resolution 2085 authorized military
intervention, it expressly authorized only AFISMA, not France, to take
"all necessary measures" to achieve the stated objectives. Second,
although the Transitional Government had consented to the French
intervention, it is unclear whether the Transitional Government had
the authority to do so, as the Transitional Government exercised
authority over less than half of the country's territory at the time. And
third, it is not clear that a fear of future terrorist attacks justifies a
preemptive military strike in "self-defense" under Article 51 of the U.N.
Charter.
Despite these ambiguities, the reaction of the international
community to Operation Serval was overwhelmingly positive. The day
after the French operations, the ECOWAS Commission "welcome[d]"
the Security Council press statement "authorising immediate
intervention in Mali to stabilise the situation."18 9 A few days later,
according to the French delegation, the Security Council in a closed-
door session unanimously supported the French intervention. 190
France also received the support of Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon,191
186. Press Release, Security Council, Security Council Press Statement on Mali,
U.N. Press Release SC/10878 (Jan. 10, 2013).
187. See M. Laurent Fabius, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Press Conference,
Embassy of France in Washington, D.C. (Jan. 11, 2013), http://ambafrance-us.org/
spip.php?article4216 [https://perma.cclVR5W-TKEZ] (archived Feb. 5, 2017).
188. See Peter Beaumont et al., Britain to Send Aircraft to Mali to Assist French
Fight Against Rebels, GUARDIAN (Jan. 12, 2013), http://www.theguardian.com/world/
2013/jan/12/mali-somalia-france-rebels-islamist-francois-hollande [https://perma.cc/
9FPZ-CBMS] (archived Feb. 5, 2017).
189. Press Release, ECOWAS, Statement of the President of the ECOWAS
Commission on the Situation in Mali (Jan. 12, 2013) http://reliefweb.int/report/mali/
statement-president-ecowas-commission-situation-mali [https://perma.cclUN7F-UABP]
(archived Mar. 5, 2017).
190. Mali: Ban Welcomes Bilateral Assistance to Stop Southward Onslaught of
Insurgents, U.N. NEWS CENTRE (Jan. 14, 2013), http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?
NewslD=43920#.WLzfHU2QyUk [https://perma.ccW474-3KFS] (archived Mar. 5, 2017)
[hereinafter Ban Welcomes Bilateral Assistance]; Mark Doyle, Mali Conflict: UN Backs
France's Military Intervention, BBC (Jan. 14, 2013), http://www.bbc.com/news/world-
africa-21021132 [https://perma.cc/QG4Z-4HC7] (archived Mar. 5, 2017).
191. Ban Welcomes Bilateral Assistance, supra note 190.
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as well as a large number of states of the international community. 192
Nevertheless, not everyone was on board. President Morsi of Egypt, for
example, expressed his disapproval of the French intervention.19 3
E. The Proposed U.S. /U.K. Intervention in Syria (2013)
In the context of the Arab Spring, nationwide protests in Syria
against President Bashar Al-Assad erupted in March 2011. In April,
the Syrian Army started launching a series of deadly military attacks
on civilian populations. Not long after, the country descended into civil
war, leading to "widespread, systematic and gross violations of human
rights" committed by government officials.194
At first, there was very little support for foreign military
intervention.19 5 In August 2012, however, President Obama stated at
a news conference that "a red line for us is [when] we start seeing a
whole bunch of [chemical or biological] weapons moving around or
being utilized."1 96 Unconfirmed reports of the use of chemical weapons
had surfaced as early as October 2012,197 and states started seriously
192. Belgium, Canada, Chad, Denmark, Germany, the Netherlands, Spain,
Sweden, the United Arab Emirates, the United Kingdom, and the United States all
provided logistical and/or military support to the French operation. In addition, Israel,
Colombia, and Chile publicly expressed their support for France. See Philip Podolsky,
Netanyahu Lauds French Intervention in Mali, TIMES OF ISRAEL (Jan. 17, 2013),
http://www.timesofisrael.com/netanyahu-lauds-french-intervention-in-malil
[https://perma.cc/5RDQ-J4ME] (archived Jan. 23, 2017); see also Francia le Expres6 a
Santos Apoyo Frente al Proceso de Paz en Colombia, AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE (Jan. 26,
2013), http://www.eltiempo.com/archivo/documento/CMS-12552383 [https://perma.cc/
7E9Q-5DYV] (archived Feb. 5, 2017).
193. Egypt's Morsi Says France's Intervention i  Mali is Creating a 'New Conflict
Hotspot', ASSOCIATED PRESS (Jan. 21, 2013), http://www.foxnews.com/world/2013/01/21/
egypt-morsi-says-france-intervention-in-mali-is-creating-new-conflict-hotspot.html
[https://perma.cclRR87-D85P] (archived Mar. 5, 2017).
194. Human Rights Council Res. S-18/1, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/RES/S-18/1, ¶ 2(a)
(Dec. 2, 2011).
195. Nada Bakri, U.N. Official Urges World to Stand Up for Syrians, N.Y. TIMES
(Oct. 14, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/10/15/world/middleeast/navi-pillay-of-the-
un-calls-for-action-on-syria.html [https://perma.cc/EX26-6R8D] (archived Jan. 22, 2017)
(noting that the U.N. High Commission for Human Rights "stopped short of calling for
military intervention" as of October 2011); Kareem Fahim, Syrian Opposition Groups
Aim for Unity, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 31, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/01/01/
world/middleeast/syrian-opposition-groups-aim-for-unity.html [https://perma.ccQT5M-
35EP] (archived Jan. 22, 2017) (noting that the two largest Syrian opposition groups
rejected foreign military intervention in December 2011); Opinion, Syria's Horrors, N.Y.
TIMES (Feb. 24, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/25/opinion/syrias-horrors.html
[https://perma.cc/VK7Y-FL22] (archived Jan. 22, 2017) (noting that most countries,
including the United States, had ruled out military intervention by February 2012).
196. Mark Landler, Obama Threatens Force Against Syria, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 20,
2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/08/21/world/middleeast/obama-threatens-force-
against-syria.html [https://perma.cclZMJ8-RRBP] (archived Jan. 22, 2017).
197. UNITED NATIONS MISSION TO INVESTIGATE ALLEGATIONS OF THE USE OF
CHEMICAL WEAPONS IN THE SYRIAN ARAB REPUBLIC, FINAL REPORT 7, reproduced in U.N.
Secretary-General, Letter dated Dec. 13, 2014 from the Secretary-General addressed to
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considering military intervention when the Syrian Revolutionary
Command Council reported on August 21, 2013 that hundreds of
civilians had been killed in a nerve gas attack in Ghouta.198
Within a week, the United Kingdom and the United States
deployed warships towards Syria.199 A couple of days later, the United
Kingdom circulated a Security Council Resolution authorizing "all
necessary measures" to protect Syrian civilians.2 00 The next day, the
United Kingdom published a "legal position" on the legality of military
intervention in Syria, arguing that, even if a resolution by the Security
Council were blocked, "the legal basis for military action would be
humanitarian intervention."201 The statement clarified that
such a legal basis is available, under the doctrine of humanitarian
intervention, provided three conditions are met:
(i) there is convincing evidence, generally accepted by the international
community as a whole, of extreme humanitarian distress on a large scale,
requiring immediate and urgent relief;
(ii) it must be objectively clear that there is no practicable alternative to the use
of force if lives are to be saved; and
(iii) the proposed use of force must be necessary and proportionate to the aim of
relief of humanitarian need and must be strictly limited in time and scope to this
aim (i.e. the minimum necessary to achieve that end and for no other purpose).
All three conditions would clearly be met in this case ... . .202
On the very day the statement was published, however, the U.K.
parliament voted against any British involvement in a military
the President of the General Assembly and the President of the Security Council, U.N.
Doc. A/68/663-S/2013/735 (Dec. 13, 2013).
198. Liam Stack, Video Shows Victims of Suspected Syrian Chemical Attack, N.Y.
TIMES: THE LEDE (Aug. 21, 2013), http://thelede.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/08/21/video-
and-images-of-victims-of-suspected-syrian-chemical-attack/ [https://perma.cc/SSW5-
5YXB] (archived Jan. 22, 2017).
199. See Sam LaGrone, U.S. and U.K. Move Ships Closer to Syria, USNI NEWS
(Aug. 26, 2013), http://news.usni.org/2013/08/26/u-s-and-u-k-move-ships-closer-to-syria
[https://perma.ccl5UXX-DSRS] (archived Jan. 22, 2017).
200. U.K. Prime Minister's Office, News Story, Syria: UK to Put Forward United
Nations Security Council Resolution, GoV.uK (Aug. 28, 2013),
https://www.gov.uk/governmentinews/syria-uk-to-put-forward-united-nations-security-
council-resolution [https://perma.cc/PWK8-ATHC] (archived Jan. 22, 2017); Alan Colwell,
Britain to Press U.N. to Authorize 'Necessary Measures' in Syria, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 28,
2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/08/29/world/middleeast/britain-syria.html
[https://perma.ccVSK4-ZS7J] (archived Jan. 22, 2017).
201. U.K. Prime Minister's Office, Policy Paper, Chemical Weapon Use by Syrian
Regime: UK Government Legal Position, ¶ 2 (Aug. 29, 2013), https://www.gov.uk/
government/publications/chemical-weapon-use-by-syrian-regime-uk-government-legal-
position/chemical-weapon-use-by-syrian-regime-uk-government-legal-position-html-
version [https://perma.cc/96MM-WZBF] (archived Jan. 22, 2017).
202. Id. 1 4.
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intervention in Syria, 203 thereby politically preventing the United
Kingdom from acting.
Two days later, President Obama decided that "the United States
should take military action against Syrian regime targets" even
"without the approval of [the] United Nations Security Council," but he
planned to first seek authorization from Congress.204 Unlike Downing
Street, the White House never explained the international legal basis
for the intervention. One week later, a White House attorney
acknowledged that military intervention "may not fit under a
traditionally recognized legal basis under international law," but she
maintained that it would be "justified and legitimate under
international law."205
The reaction of the international community was divided. At the
time, the United States asserted that nine other states had "publicly
and explicitly expressed support for U.S. military action."206 France,
for example, agreed that "if the Security Council is blocked from acting,
a coalition will form" to take military action. 207 China, Russia, and
Iran, however, all expressed opposition to foreign military
intervention.208 In addition, the Joint Special Representative of the
United Nations and the League of Arab States for Syria Lakhdar
Brahimi insisted that Security Council authorization was absolutely
necessary.209 Moreover, Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon also opposed
military intervention without Security Council authorization. 210
203. Cassell Bryan-low, U.K Parliament Rejects Syria Action, WALL ST. J. (Aug.
29, 2013), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424127887324463604579042571741346
530 [https://perma.ccl9R3C-EPCV] (archived Jan. 22, 2017).
204. Press Release, Press Secretary, Statement by the President on Syria (Aug.
31, 2013), http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/08/31/statement-president-
syria [https://perma.cc/3J7W-7P6T] (archived Jan. 22, 2017).
205. Charlie Savage, Obama Tests Limits of Power in Syrian Conflict, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 8, 2013, at Al.
206. Those nine states were Australia, Albania, Canada, Denmark, France,
Kosovo, Poland, Romania, and Turkey. Daily Press Briefing, U.S. DEP'T OF STATE (Sept.
5, 2013), https://2009-2017.state.gov/r/palprs/dpbl2013/09/213851.htm [https://perma.cc/
U6ZM-PHQW] (archived Feb. 13, 2017).
207. Vincent Giret et al., Reforme pinale, Syrie, pression fiscale... Hollande
s'explique dans 'Le Monde", LE MONDE (Aug. 30, 2013), http://www.lemonde.fr/politiquel
article/2013/08/30/hollande-au-monde-le-massacre-de-damas-ne-peut-ni-ne-doit-rester-
impuni_3468851_823448.html [https://perma.cc/NS7Z-Z427] (archived Jan. 22, 2017) ("Si
le Conseil de s~curit6 est empich6 d'agir, une coalition se formera.").
208. David Jolly et al., U.S. Releases Detailed Intelligence on Syrian Chemical
Attack, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 30, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/08/31/world/
middleeast/syria.html [https:/perma.cclA5XE-7HRG] (archived Jan. 22, 2017).
209. See. U.N. Secretary-General, Transcript of Press Conference by the Special
Envoy for Syria (Aug. 28, 2013), http://www.un.org/sg/offthecufflindex.asp?nid=2953
[https://perma.cc/EH6U-V8HV] (archived Jan. 22, 2017).
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In any case, the agitation for military intervention-at least as a
response to the use of chemical weapons-abated after the United
States and Russia concluded the Framework for Elimination of Syrian
Chemical Weapons2 11 in September 2013.212
F. The U.S. Intervention at Mount Sinjar in Iraq (2014)
In 2006, a number of Sunni insurgent groups in Iraq united to
form the Islamic State of Iraq (ISI). By 2013, the ISI had expanded into
Syria and renamed itself the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant
(ISIL). The following year, it rose to international prominence after a
series of successful military operations in Iraq.2 13 The goal of ISIL has
been to establish a "unitary and worldwide Islamic state or caliphate"
under sharia law.2 14
Its governance, however, has involved indiscriminate killings of
civilians, mass executions, religious persecution, ethnic cleansing,
sexual violence, arbitrary detention, and other gross violations of
human rights.2 15 In August 2014, the Security Council in Resolution
2170 "condemn[ed] in the strongest erms the terrorist acts of ISIL and
its violent extremist ideology, and its continued gross, systematic and
widespread abuses of human rights and violations of international
humanitarian law ... ."216
One particular incident is notable for the purposes of
humanitarian intervention: on August 3, 2014, ISIL attacked and
captured Sinjar,2 17 a town in northern Iraq inhabited primarily by
Yazidis. As the Yazidi people do not practice Sunni Islam, ISIL had
211. Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), Framework
for Elimination of Syrian Chemical Weapons, OPCW Doc. EC-M-33/NAT.1 (Sept. 17,
2013).
212. CHRISTOPHER M. BLANCHARD ET AL., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL33487,
ARMED CONFLICT IN SYRIA: OVERVIEW AND U.S. RESPONSE 25-26 (2015); JAMES E.
CRONIN, GLOBAL RULES: AMERICA, BRITAIN AND A DISORDERED WORLD 307 (2014).
213. See BLANCHARD ET AL., supra note 212, at 1.
214. From the Battle ofAl-Ahzab to the War of Coalitions, DABIQ, Sept. 2015, at
56, http://clarionproject.org/docs/Issue%2011%20-%2OFrom%20the%20battle%20of%20
Al-Ahzab%20to%20the%20war%20of%2Ocoalitions.pdf [https://perma.cc/4UDB-NCMH]
(archived Mar. 19, 2017)
215. U.N. Security Council Res. 2170, 1 2 (Aug. 15, 2014); AMNESTY INT'L ETHNIC
CLEANSING ON A HISTORIC SCALE: ISLAMIC STATE'S SYSTEMATIC TARGETING OF
MINORITIES IN NORTHERN IRAQ 4 (2014); see generally REP. OF INDEPENDENT
INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION OF INQUIRY ON THE SYRIAN ARAB REPUBLIC, RULE OF
TERROR: LIVING UNDER ISIS IN SYRIA (2014) (giving specific examples of the human
rights violations committed by ISIL).
216. S.C. Res. 2170, 1 1 (Aug. 15, 2014).
217. U.N. Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), OCHA
Flash Update: Iraq Crisis - Significant Displacement from Sinjar, No. 2, 1 1 (Aug. 4,
2014) [hereinafter OCHA Flash Update: Iraq Crisis - Significant Displacement from
Sinjar, No. 2].
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called for their systematic destruction.218 ISIL forces who entered the
town threatened civilians to "convert or die."219 Of the approximately
two hundred thousand civilians who fled the town, 220 about forty
thousand fled to Mount Sinjar, where they lacked water, food, and
shelter, and were effectively surrounded by armed ISIL forces. 221 A
humanitarian disaster was imminent.222
On August 7, 2014 the Security Council issued a press statement
"call[ing] on the international community to support the Government
and people of Iraq and to do all it can to help alleviate the suffering of
the population affected by the current conflict in Iraq."22 3 That day,
President Obama authorized U.S. airstrikes "to break the siege of
Mount Sinjar."224 As Obama noted, "when many thousands of innocent
civilians are faced with the danger of being wiped out, and we have the
capacity to do something about it, we will take action."225
The following day, when asked what the legal justification was for
the airstrikes, a senior administration official invoked the consent of
the host state, stating that "we believe that any actions we would take,
to include airstrikes, would be consistent with international law, as we
have a request from the Government of Iraq."226 Nevertheless, as in
Somalia, C6te d'Ivoire, and Mali, one might question the capacity of
the host government to give consent, as the Iraqi government was
218. Office of the Press Secretary, Statement by the President, THE WHITE HOUSE
(Aug. 7, 2014), http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2014/08/07/statement-
president [https:/perma.ccJL4E-E69Q] (archived Jan. 22, 2017).
219. Atika Shubert et al., Convert or die: ISIS chief's former slave says he beat
her, raped U.S. hostage, CNN (Sept. 11, 2015), http://www.cnn.com/2015/09/09
middleeast/al-baghdadi-isis-slavel [https://perma.ccl8EE3-X6AA] (archived Jan. 22,
2017); Mohammed A Salih & Wiadimir van Wilgenburg, Iraqi Yazidis: 'If we move they
will kill us', AL JAZEERA (Aug. 5, 2014), http://www.aljazeera.comInews/middleeast/
2014/08/iraqi-yazidis-if-move-they-will-kill-us-20148513656188206.html
[https://perma.ccl38VY-RWVW] (archived Jan. 22, 2017).
220. Tim Arango, Sunni Extremists in Iraq Seize 3 Towns From Kurds and
Threaten Major Dam, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 3, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/08/04/
world/middleeast/iraq.html [https://perma.cc/QD9W-P3PU] (archived Jan. 22, 2017).
221. OCHA Flash Update: Iraq Crisis - Significant Displacement from Sinjar, No.
2, supra note 217, T1 2-3; Spencer Ackerman et al., US carries out air drops to help
Iraqis trapped on mountain by Isis, GUARDIAN (Aug. 7, 2014),
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/aug/07/us-aid-iraqi-trapped-mountain-isis
[https://perma.cc/Q6DZ-4KJP] (archived Jan. 22, 2017).
222. KENNETH KATZMAN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RS21968, IRAQ: POLITICS,
SECURITY, AND U.S. POLICY 17 (2015).
223. Press Release, Security Council, Security Council Press Statement on Iraq,
U.N. Press Release SC/11515 (Aug. 7, 2014).
224. Office of the Press Secretary, supra note 218. President Obama also
authorized airstrikes to protect U.S. personnel in a related but separate operation.
225. Id.
226. Office of the Press Secretary, Background Briefing by Senior Administration
Officials on Iraq, THE WHITE HOUSE (Aug. 8, 2014), http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-
press-office/2014/08/08/background-briefing-senior-administration-officials-iraq
[https://perma.cc/M64J-QCSV ] (archived Jan. 22, 2017).
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arguably in the middle of a Civil War with ISIL, which had taken
control over a large portion of Iraqi territory.
The reactions of other states to the U.S. airstrikes to save the
Yazidis is not well documented in publicly available information,
perhaps partly because the Iraqi Kurdish peshmerga ended up playing
a large role in rescuing the Yazidis. 227 Nevertheless, no strong
objections were voiced against the U.S. airstrikes, and, significantly,
the European Union and other states joined the United States in
providing humanitarian relief to the Yazidis.2 28
G. The U.S.-Led Intervention in Syria (2014-2016)
Although the United States had, for the most part, refrained from
intervening in Syria for the first three years of the conflict, 229 on
September 10, 2014, President Obama announced that the United
States and its allies would aim to "degrade and ultimately destroy"
ISIL not only in Iraq, but also in Syria.230 At least one of the principal
purposes for doing so was humanitarian in nature. In his speech,
President Obama noted:
In a region that has known so much bloodshed, these terrorists are unique in
their brutality. They execute captured prisoners. They kill children. They
enslave, rape, and force women into marriage. They threatened a religious
227. Dana Ford & Josh Levs, 'Heroic' mission rescues desperate Yazidis from
ISIS, CNN (Aug. 16, 2014), http://www.cnn.com/2014/08/11/world/meast/iraq-rescue-
mission/ [https://perma.cc/8WFQ-DPJW] (archived Jan. 22, 2017); Kurds rescue Yazidis
from Iraqi mountain, AL JAZEERA (Aug. 10, 2014), http://www.aljazeera.cominews/
middleeast/2014/08/kurds-rescue-yazidis-from-iraq-mountain-201489135227783157.html
[https://perma.cclYEC7-8DBT] (archived Jan. 22, 2017).
228. Jade Azim, International help for Yazidis trapped by Islamic State on Mount
Sinjar, GUARDIAN (Aug. 13, 2014), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/aug/13/inter
national-help-yazidis-trapped-islamic-state-isis-iraq [https://perma.cc/94DH-KM66]
(archived Jan. 22, 2017); Final resolution of Yazidi conference at European parliament
issued, EKURD DAILY (Nov. 20, 2014), http://ekurd.net/mismas/articles/
misc2014/1 1/kurdsiniraq288.htm [https://perma.ccV677-93A9] (archived Jan. 22, 2017).
229. Before September 2014, the United States had been providing some covert
military support to Syrian rebels, although the exact extent of the support is unknown.
See David S. Cloud & Raja Abdulrahim, U.S. has secretly provided arms training to Syria
rebels since 2012, L.A. TIMES (June 21, 2013), http://articles.latimes.com/2013/
jun/21/world/la-fg-cia-syria-20130622 [https://perma.cc/8XTY-KRTAI (archived Jan. 22,
2017); Greg Miller & Karin DeYoung, Secret CIA effort in Syria faces large funding cut,
WASH. POST (June 12, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-
security/lawmakers-move-to-curb-1 billion-cia-program-to-train-
syrian-rebels/2015/06/12/b0f45a9e-1114-11e5-adec-e82f8395cO32_story.html [ ttps://
perma.cc/7PGR-E5RV] (archived Jan. 22, 2017).
230. Office of the Press Secretary, Statement by the President on ISIL, THE
WHITE HOUSE (Sept. 10, 2014), https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2014/09/
10/statement-president-isil- 1 [https://perma.cc/QT5K-K4ZT] (archived Jan. 22, 2017).
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minority with genocide. And in acts of barbarism, they took the lives of two
American journalists -- Jim Foley and Steven Sotloff.231
On September 22, the United States, along with Bahrain, Jordan,
Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates, commenced
airstrikes in Syria. 232 The following day, U.S. Ambassador to the
United Nations Samantha Power sent a letter to Secretary-General
Ban Ki-moon justifying the intervention. Rather than calling the
operation a humanitarian intervention, however, she expressly
invoked the "inherent right of individual and collective self-defence"
under Article 51 of the U.N. Charter.2 33 Ambassador Power noted that
Iraq was subject to "continuing attacks from ISIL coming out of safe
havens in Syria . . . against Iraq's people,"234 and referenced a letter
from the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Iraq to the President of the
Security Council, received three days earlier, expressly "request[ing]
the United States of America to lead international efforts to strike ISIL
sites" outside of Iraq's borders.235 In light of the fact that Syria was
"unwilling or unable to prevent the use of its territory for such attacks,"
she argued, the United States had taken "necessary and proportionate
military actions in Syria in order to eliminate the ongoing ISIL threat
to Iraq."236
Two months later, the United Kingdom sent a similar letter to the
Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council, invoking
collective self-defense on behalf of Iraq under Article 51, but without
the "unwilling or unable" language.237 As of August 2016, nine other
231. Id..
232. KENNETH KATZMAN ET AL., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R43612, THE "ISLAMIC
STATE" CRISIS AND U.S. POLICY 12 (2015); Jim Sciutto, U.S. airstrikes hit ISIS inside
Syria for first time, CNN (Sept. 23, 2014), http://www.cnn.com/2014/09/22/world/meast/
u-s-airstrikes-isis-syrial [https://perma.cclUA4L-W2EN] (archived Jan. 22, 2017); News
Release, Airstrikes Continue Against ISIL in Syria, Iraq, U.S. DEP'T OF DEF. (Oct. 31,
2014), http://www.defense.gov/News-Article-View/Article/603566/airstrikes-continue-
against-isil-in-syria-iraq [https://perma.cclEM4A-5VLQ] (archived Jan. 22, 2017); US,
Arab allies launch first wave of strikes in Syria, Fox NEWS (Sept. 23, 2014),
http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2014/09/23/us-launches-first-wave-bombing-strikes-
over-syrial [https://perma.cclTRE6-BQ7V] (archived Jan. 22, 2017).
233. U.S. Article 51 Letter, supra note 2.
234. Id.
235. Permanent Rep. of Iraq to the U.N., Letter dated Sept. 20, 2014 from the
Permanent Rep. of Iraq to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security
Council, U.N. Doc. S/2014/691 (Sept. 20, 2014).
236. U.S. Article 51 Letter, supra note 2.
237. U.K. Article 51 Letter, supra note 2. According to some commentators,
however, Prime Minister Cameron has impliedly accepted and applied the "unwilling or
unable" test. Ashley Deeks, The UK's Article 51 Letter on Use of Force in Syria, LAWFARE
(Dec. 12, 2014), https://www.lawfareblog.com/uks-article-51-letter-use-force-syria [https://
perma.cc/92V3-UFUB] (archived Jan. 23, 2017); Ashley Deeks, UK Air Strike in Syria
(with France and Australia Not Far Behind), LAWFARE (Sept. 9, 2015),
https://www.lawfareblog.com/uk-air-strike-syria-france-and-australia-not-far-behind
[https://perma.cc/4FUF-3B28] (archived Jan. 23, 2017); Kevin Jon Heller, A "Broad
Consensus" - of Between Two and Four States, OPINIO JURIs (Sept. 25, 2015),
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states-Canada, Turkey, Australia, France, Germany, Denmark, the
Netherlands, Norway, and Belgium-have sent similar letters to the
United Nations, invoking individual and/or collective self-defense
under Article 51.238 Canada, Turkey, and Australia employed the
"unwilling or unable" formulation in their letters,2 39 whereas Germany
and Belgium, in a similar fashion, noted that the Syrian government
does not exercise "effective control" over the territory from which ISIL
operates.240
The self-defense justifications offered by these eleven states raise
the question, as France's intervention in Mali did, of whether a foreign
terrorist threat can justify a preemptive attack. Aside from a few
exceptions, the international community on the whole appears to
approve of these military interventions against ISIL in Syria. To begin
with, many states have at some point in time participated in the
airstrikes.241 And the day after the United States and its Arab allies
commenced the airstrikes, Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon issued the
following statement:
http://opiniojuris.org/2015/09/25/a-broad-consensus-of-between-two-and-four-states/
[https://perma.cc/CD6D-7VJT] (archived Jan. 23, 2017) (calling Deeks's observation
regarding the United Kingdom "correct[]").
238. Australian Article 51 Letter, supra note 2; Belgian Article 51 Letter, supra
note 2; Canadian Article 51 Letter, supra note 2; Danish Article 51 Letter, supra note 2;
Dutch Article 51 Letter, supra note 2; French Article 51 Letter, supra note 2; German
Article 51 Letter, supra note 2; Norwegian Article 51 Letter, supra note 2; Turkish
Article 51 Letter, supra note 2.
239. Australian Article 51 Letter, supra note 2; Canadian Article 51 Letter, supra
note 2; Turkish Article 51 Letter, supra note 2; see Kevin Jon Heller, France Fails to
Adopt "Unwilling or Unable" in Syria, OPINIO JURIS (Oct. 11, 2015),
http://opiniojuris.org/2015/10/1 /france-fails-to-adopt-unwilling-or-unable-in-syrial
[https://perma.cclV7KA-PPWQ] (archived Jan. 23, 2017); see generally Ashley S. Deeks,
"Unwilling or Unable": Toward a Normative Framework for Extraterritorial Self-
Defense, 52 VA. J. INT'L L. 483 (2012) (providing a descriptive and normative analysis of
the "unwilling or unable" test).
240. Belgian Article 51 Letter, supra note 2; German Article 51 Letter, supra note
2; see Marko Milanovic, Belgium's Article 51 Letter to the Security Council [UPDATED],
EJIL: TALK! (June 17, 2016), http://www.ejiltalk.org/belgiums-article-51-letter-to-the-
security-council/ [https://perma.cc/8DLA-J3RP] (archived Jan. 23, 2017). Secretary-
General Ban Ki-moon has also employed the "effective control" language. See infra note
242 and accompanying text. On the question of the relationship between the "unwilling
or unable" standard and the "effective control" standard, Brian Egan, Legal Adviser to
the U.S. Department of State, noted, "With respect o the 'unable' prong of the standard,
inability perhaps can be demonstrated most plainly, for example, where a State has lost
or abandoned effective control over the portion of its territory from which the non-State
actor is operating." Brian Egan, Keynote Address at the 2016 Annual Meeting of the
American Society of International Law (Apr. 1, 2016); see Douglas Cantwell, "Unwilling
or Unable" in the Legal Adviser's ASIL Speech, LAWFARE (Apr. 12, 2016),
https://www.lawfareblog.com/unwilling-or-unable-legal-advisers-asil-speech [https://perma.
cc/VY5J-JABE] (archived Jan. 23, 2017).
241. KATHLEEN J. MCINNIS, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R44135, COALITION
CONTRIBUTIONS TO COUNTERING THE ISLAMIc STATE 7-10 (2016).
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I am aware that today's strikes were not carried out at the direct request of the
Syrian Government, but I note that the Government was informed beforehand.
I also note that the strikes took place in areas no longer under the effective
control of that Government. I think it is undeniable - and the subject of broad
international consensus - that these extremist groups pose an immediate threat
to international peace and security.242
Nevertheless, not everyone was on board. Russia243 and Iran,244
for example, opposed the military intervention without the consent of
the Syrian government or a Security Council authorization.
V. HUmANITARIAN INTERVENTION AT THE MARGINS
As discussed in Section III.B above, many commentators argue, in
line with ICJ jurisprudence, that the classification of a case as a
humanitarian intervention requires that the intervening power
actually invoke humanitarian intervention as its legal justification.245
Under this definition, there has not been a single case of humanitarian
intervention over the past decade. Even the U.K.-proposed
intervention in Syria after the chemical weapon attacks in Ghouta
would not count, as that incident did not result in an actual
intervention. So, if one were to accept the point of view of these
commentators, it would be disingenuous to argue that humanitarian
intervention is an emerging norm.
Nevertheless, in light of the examination of these seven incidents,
it would be equally disingenuous to argue that agitation for the norm
of humanitarian intervention is entirely absent. Arguably, it has now
become common for an intervening power to invoke a traditional
exception to the prohibition on the use of force to justify a
humanitarian intervention, even when the facts do not completely fit
within the scope of the exception. And the international community
has, on many occasions, though not on all occasions, approved of the
intervention, thereby raising the possibility that the doctrine of
242. U.N. Secretary-General, Remarks at the Climate Summit Press Conference
(Including Comments on Syria) (Sept. 23, 2014), https://www.un.org/sg/en/content/sg/
speeches/2014-09-23/remarks-climate-summit-press-conference-including-comments-
syria [https://perma.cc/HE2T-EBPH] (archived Jan. 23, 2017).
243. Russia warns US against strikes on Islamic State in Syria, BBC (Sept. 11,
2014), http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-29154481 [https://perma.ccLT42-
HN9C] (archived Jan. 23, 2017).
244. US-led airstrikes in Syria lack legal basis: Iran president, IRAN FRONT PAGE
(Sept. 23, 2014), http://ifpnews.com/news/world/middle-east/2014/09/us-led-airstrikes-
syria-lack-legal-basis-iran-president/ [https://perma.cclGB57-UJXD] (archived Feb. 13,
2017); Thomas Barrabi, Iran's Hassan Rouhani Condemns US Airstrikes Against ISIS
In Syria As Illegal, INT'L Bus. TIMES (Sept. 23, 2014), http://www.ibtimes.com/irans-
hassan-rouhani-condemns-us-airstrikes-against-isis-syria-illegal-1693566 (last visited
Jan. 23, 2017) [https://perma.cc/XF38-3ARG] (archived Jan. 23, 2017).
245. See supra notes 86-89 and accompanying text.
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humanitarian intervention, though not yet an established norm of
international law, has some force at the margins.
This is not a new phenomenon. In the aftermath of ECOWAS's
interventions in Liberia and Sierra Leone in the 1990s, commentators
started asserting that the interventions were justified because of an
emerging norm of post hoc Security Council authorization.246 And in
subsequent publications, ICISS, the U.N. Secretary-General, and the
AU all accepted the possibility that regional organizations could obtain
post hoc authorization from the Security Council for humanitarian
interventions. 247 Although not expressly accepted by Secretary-
General Ban Ki-moon's report of 2009,248 this development reflected
humanitarian intervention at the margins: humanitarian intervention
alone may not have been sufficient to justify a military intervention,
but it allowed the intervening power to broaden the scope of traditional
exceptions to the prohibition on the use of force.
Over the past decade, as evidenced in the seven incidents
examined in this Article, three new paradigms of humanitarian
intervention at the margins have emerged: (1) mission creep, (2)
antiterrorism, and (3) partisan support.
A. Mission Creep
In the mission creep paradigm, the intervening power invokes a
Security Council resolution as the legal justification for its
humanitarian intervention, even though the intervention arguably
falls outside the mandate of the resolution. When this is the case, the
norm of humanitarian intervention may allow the intervening power
to widen the mission authorized by the Security Council, a theory that
some commentators have referred to as "implied authorization."249
The implementation of no-fly zones in Iraq after the First Gulf
War, as well as NATO's intervention in the Kosovo war, could be seen
as examples of mission creep. And, over the past decade, this trend has
continued in Libya, C6te d'Ivoire, and Mali. In each case, the
intervening power arguably exceeded its mandate. In Libya, NATO
allegedly pursued "regime change" rather than "the protection of
civilians" authorized under Resolution 1973. In C6te d'Ivoire, UNOCI
and France similarly sought to depose Mr. Gbagbo, arguably going
beyond their mandate to "protect civilians" under Resolution 1975. And
in Mali, France launched Operation Serval against the Islamist
militants, even though Resolution 2085 expressly authorized France
only to "provide coordinated assistance . . . to the Malian Defence and
Security Forces . . . in order to . . . reduce the threat posed by terrorist
246. See supra note 85.
247. See supra notes 46, 48-49 and accompanying text.
248. See supra note 53 and accompanying text.
249. See Johnstone, supra note 7, at 238-43.
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organizations and associated groups .... ."250 To be clear, this Article
does not assert that these operations exceeded their Security Council
mandates; rather, it simply notes that other states and commentators
have made such assertions, and that such assertions are not without
merit.
In two of the cases-C6te d'Ivoire and Mali-the international
community appeared to have welcomed the intervention. Part of the
reason, no doubt, was that the interventions had humanitarian
objectives. The Gbagbo regime had been indiscriminately shelling
civilian populations,251 and the Islamist militants in Mali had been
committing gross violations of human rights against innocent
civilians.252 Libya was another story: key members of the international
community condemned NATO's intervention in Libya. Nevertheless, it
should not be overlooked that there were still a significant number of
states-primarily Western, developed states-that supported the
intervention.
One cannot draw sweeping conclusions from these three incidents
of mission creep. But it would be fair to say that humanitarian
intervention was at least operating at the margins.
B. Antiterrorism
In the antiterrorism paradigm, the intervening power invokes
self-defense under Article 51 of the U.N. Charter as the legal
justification for its humanitarian intervention, but its argument
hinges on the acceptance of antiterrorism activities against a non-state
actor as preemptive self-defense.253 The fact that the host state is
"unwilling or unable" to suppress the threat itself may carry some
weight in justifying this exercise of the right of self-defense, at least
according to four states.254 And, according to two states, whether the
host state exercises "effective control" over the territory in question
may also strengthen this justification.255 Commentators have taken
various viewpoints on the preemptive self-defense justification,25 6 and
250. S.C. Res. 2085, 1 9 (Dec. 20, 2012).
251. See supra note 162 and accompanying text.
252. See supra notes 176-178 and accompanying text.
253. Scholars also use the terms "anticipatory self-defense" and "preventive self-
defense" alongside the term "preemptive self-defense." For an attempt to distinguish and
define these three terms, see Ashley S. Deeks, Taming the Doctrine of Pre-emption, in
THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF THE USE OF FORCE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 7, at
662-63.
254. See supra note 239.
255. See supra note 240.
256. See generally Deeks, supra note 253, at 661 (presenting various viewpoints
on the question of anticipatory, preemptive, and preventive self-defense); GRAY, supra
note 7, at 114 ("The law on self-defence is the subject of the most fundamental
disagreement between states and between writers."); Kevin Jon Heller, France Fails to
Adopt "Unwilling or Unable" in Syria, OPINIO JURIS (Oct. 11, 2015),
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it suffices to say that many still question the legality of such
"antiterrorism" interventions.
Nevertheless, when there is a humanitarian crisis in the host
state, military intervention under this theory appears to be more
acceptable. Drawing examples from the past decade, the French
intervention in Mali and the U.S.-led intervention against ISIS in
Syria stand for this hypothesis. In Mali, France argued, inter alia, that
its attack on the Islamist militant groups was partly justified out of
self-defense, and states generally welcomed the French intervention.
Similarly, in Syria, the United States was able to build a coalition of
eleven states to launch airstrikes in Syria, and, although a few states
have objected, most states that have voiced their opinions appear to
support the intervention.
Once again, two incidents are insufficient for drawing any
definitive conclusions. But it appears that a humanitarian motive may
help widen the self-defense exception to accommodate antiterrorism
operations.
C. Partisan Support
In the partisan support paradigm, the intervening power invokes
the consent of the host state to justify its military intervention, but the
host state is embroiled in a civil war and the intervening power only
obtains the consent of one faction-often the faction with stronger
international support. The problem here, as most commentators agree,
is that intervention based on consent is prohibited in the context of a
civil war, especially where control over state territory is divided. 257
Indeed, at least one prominent commentator has criticized Russia's
airstrikes in Syria as unlawful because "a very large number of states
have determined that the Assad government can no longer fully claim
to represent he people of Syria."2 5 8
Four of the seven incidents examined above reflect this paradigm:
Somalia, C6te d'Ivoire, Mali, and Iraq. The TFG in Somalia consented
to IGAD's intervention, Mr. Ouattara's forces impliedly invited UNOCI
and France to help assault Mr. Gbagbo's last stronghold, the
Transitional Government in Mali formally invited France to come to
its assistance, and Iraq invited the United States to strike the ISIL
forces besieging Mount Sinjar. The common thread in all four cases is
http://opiniojuris.org/2015/10/1 /france-fails-to-adopt-unwilling-or-unable-in-syrial
[https://perma.cc/23FZ-QP6C] (archive Feb. 5, 2016) (arguing against an alleged "broad
consensus" for the "unwilling or unable" standard).
257. GRAY, supra note 7, at 81; U.K. FOREIGN & COMMONWEALTH OFFICE, supra
note 31, at 614; Nolte, supra note 30, ¶ 18.
258. Nick Robins-Early, Russia Says Its Airstrikes In Syria Are Perfectly Legal.
Are They?, WORLD POST (Oct. 1, 2015), http://www.huffingtonpost.comlentry/russia-
airstrikes-syria-international-law_560d6448e4b0dd85030b0c08 [https://perma.cc/
BU5-8A7W] (archived Jan. 23, 2017).
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that the inviting power-the alleged representative of the host state-
did not have full authority over the state and was arguably in a state
of civil war. As such, under traditional international law doctrine, it is
questionable whether the inviting powers actually had the authority to
consent to a military intervention.
Nevertheless, the international community's reactions to these
interventions, aside from the IGAD's proposed intervention in Somalia,
were largely positive. Consequently, one may suspect that a
humanitarian cause may ease the restriction on the ability of one
faction to consent to foreign military intervention in times of internal
conflict.
Table 1 below summarizes which paradigms the seven incidents
fall under, and whether the international community's reaction to the
intervention or proposed intervention was largely positive or negative.
Table 1: Recent Incidents of Humanitarian Intervention







Intervention in X negative
Libya (2011)
The UNOCI/French
Intervention in C6te X X positive
d'Ivoire (2011)
The French











Intervention in X positive
Syria (2014-2016)
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VI. CONCLUSION
One must be careful when drawing conclusions from a study of
incidents. In selecting these seven incidents, no specific effort was
made to choose a sample that is representative of the entire population
of military interventions. There was also no attempt to isolate the
independent variables that ultimately influenced how key actors in the
international community reacted to the interventions. Indeed, in many
cases, it is possible that international approval for the military
intervention in question may have been the product of international
politics rather than a reflection of attitudes towards humanitarian
intervention. Each incident arises from its own unique political, legal,
and factual context. Consequently, it would be inappropriate to
generalize from these incidents.
Nevertheless, one cannot turn a blind eye to this agitation for
humanitarian intervention at the margins. At least some, if not all of
the seven incidents can only with difficulty be assimilated into one of
the three traditional exceptions to the prohibition on the use of force.
As a result, there must be an underlying element that not only compels
the intervening power to intervene but also drives the international
community to accept that intervention. This element is humanitarian
intervention, and these incidents reveal that humanitarian
intervention has developed considerably at the margins over the past
decade.
It is true that genuine state practice and opinio juris of
humanitarian intervention are still lacking. As a result, it would be
erroneous to argue that a customary exception to the prohibition on the
use of force based on humanitarian intervention exists as a matter of
lex lata. There is no free ticket for a state to militarily intervene in
another state for the purpose of ending gross violations of human
rights. Nevertheless, the incidents discussed here reveal that the norm
of humanitarian intervention is developing, and key actors in the
international system are responding to this developing norm.
At the moment, it appears that the norm of humanitarian
intervention, at the very least, serves as a tool for widening the
traditional exceptions to the prohibition on the use of force. Although
military intervention based on a Security Council resolution normally
must stay within the limits of the resolution, there appears to be
greater leeway when it comes to a humanitarian intervention.
Although ambiguity remains in the legitimacy of preemptive self-
defense, this exception to the prohibition on the use of force appears to
widen when the intervention has humanitarian and antiterrorism
purposes. And, although intervention based on the consent of the host
state normally requires approval from a clear sovereign authority, if
the intervention has humanitarian objectives, it appears that consent
may also be given by a government that does not have control over all
of its territory.
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These are not firm rules that establish whether a state,
intervening on humanitarian grounds, is in violation of international
law. Rather, these are observations of the reactions of key actors in the
international community to certain incidents of humanitarian
intervention over the past decade.

